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Defining Flight Risk 
Lauryn P. Gouldin† 
Our illogical and too-well-traveled paths to pretrial detention have created 
staggering costs for defendants who spend unnecessary time in pretrial detention 
and for taxpayers who fund a broken system. These problems remain recalcitrant 
even as a third generation of reform efforts makes impressive headway. They are 
likely to remain so until judges, attorneys, legislators, and scholars address a fun-
damental definitional problem: the collapsing of very different types of behavior 
that result in failures to appear in court into a single, undifferentiated category of 
nonappearance risk. That single category muddies critical distinctions that this 
Article’s new taxonomy of pretrial nonappearance risks clarifies. This taxonomy 
(i) isolates true flight risk (the risk that a defendant will flee the jurisdiction) from 
other forms of “local” nonappearance risk and (ii) distinguishes between local non-
appearance risks based on persistence, willfulness, amenability to intervention, 
and cost. 
Upon examination, it is clear that flight and nonappearance are not simply 
interchangeable names for the same concept, nor are they merely different degrees 
of the same type of risk. In the context of measuring and managing risks, many de-
fendants who merely fail to appear differ in important ways from their fugitive 
cousins. Precision about these distinctions is constitutionally mandated and statu-
torily required. It is also essential for current reform efforts that are aimed at iden-
tifying less intrusive and lower-cost interventions that can effectively manage the 
full range of nonappearance and flight risks. These distinctions are not reflected in 
the pretrial risk-assessment tools that are increasingly being employed across the 
country. But they should be. A more nuanced understanding of these differences 
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will be a key piece of broader efforts to reduce judicial reliance on pretrial deten-
tion and to mitigate the risks posed by defendants on release. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The number of low-risk defendants who spend time in pre-
trial detention in this country is staggering: “Every year, more 
than 11 million people move through America’s 3,100 local jails, 
many on low-level, non-violent misdemeanors.”1 According to a 
 
 1 FACT SHEET: Launching the Data-Driven Justice Initiative: Disrupting the 
Cycle of Incarceration (White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 30, 2016), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/QKE5-PJVH (“On any given day, across the country more than 
450,000 people are held in jail before trial.”). 
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Department of Justice estimate, up to two-thirds of the members 
of this population pose “no significant risk to . . . the community” 
and “a low risk of flight.”2 In a study in New York City, Human 
Rights Watch documented similarly high rates of overuse of pre-
trial detention: more than 20 percent of pretrial detainees 
charged with misdemeanors were not ultimately convicted and 
over half of those who were convicted were not sentenced to in-
carceration.3 Studies show that nine out of ten pretrial felony 
detainees remain incarcerated because they cannot afford their 
bail,4 demonstrating the system’s inequities and inefficiencies. 
The tragic death of Kalief Browder highlights layers of sys-
temic dysfunction. After being arrested as a sixteen-year-old, 
Browder spent three years in pretrial detention at Rikers Island, 
mostly in solitary confinement, and was released only when the 
charges against him were eventually dropped.5 Browder’s pre-
trial detention was not justified by any public-safety claim,6 and 
given his family’s limited resources, he was not likely to flee the 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the judge set bail at a figure that 
Browder and his family could not afford ($3,000), and Browder 
was detained.7 He remained in jail because he refused to plead 
guilty (even to a deal for time served) to a crime he said he had 
not committed.8 Browder’s detention story is just one example of 
the routine phenomenon of wealth-based pretrial detention that 
cannot be justified as managing any cognizable or legitimate 
 
 2 ABA Criminal Justice Section, State Policy Implementation Project *2, archived 
at http://perma.cc/K78U-HJ7Q. 
 3 Human Rights Watch, The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low 
Income Nonfelony Defendants in New York City *29–30 (Dec 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/RC9D-H8TJ (noting that nonfelony defendants were serving time in jail 
pretrial “only because they were unable to post bail”), quoting Mary T. Phillips, Pretrial 
Detention and Case Outcomes, Part 1: Nonfelony Cases *59 (New York City Criminal 
Justice Agency, Nov 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/P5FT-JWPZ. 
 4 Ram Subramanian, et al, Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in 
America *32 (Vera Institute of Justice, July 29, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R8PT 
-3PB7 (explaining that, of felony defendants who spend the full pretrial period in jail, 
“only one in ten” is incarcerated because a judge denied bail and ordered him or her to be 
detained and “[t]he rest simply cannot afford . . . bail”). 
 5 Tina Rosenberg, Putting Fewer Innocents behind Bars (NY Times, July 3, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/QVD9-7JJ2. 
 6 Id. Judges need not consider public-safety concerns in pretrial detention and bail 
decisions. See NY Crim Proc Law § 510.30(2)(a). 
 7 Rosenberg, Putting Fewer Innocents behind Bars (cited in note 5). By the time 
Browder’s family eventually raised the money, his status as an alleged probation violator 
precluded release. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law (New Yorker, Oct 6, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/GZ4Z-45E3 (first reporting Browder’s story). 
 8 Gonnerman, Before the Law (cited in note 7). 
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risk.9 When Browder’s story was first reported in 2014, it 
sparked public outrage and spurred efforts to reform pretrial de-
tention policies.10 Tragically, Browder never recovered from his 
experience, and he committed suicide in 2015.11 His death has 
renewed and amplified calls for a range of pretrial reforms.12 
Significant bail reforms are underway. Across the country, 
constitutional and statutory amendments, impact litigation, and 
community-based initiatives are forcing jurisdictions to change 
their pretrial practices, sometimes dramatically.13 Much of the 
focus in this active “third generation” of bail reform efforts is on 
judicial decisionmaking.14 Judges deciding whether to release or 
detain defendants before trial have broad discretion.15 They tend 
 
 9 See Alec Karakatsanis, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure of 
American Lawyers, 128 Harv L Rev F 253, 262 (2015) (describing pretrial hearings as an 
“assembly line” moving impoverished people into “cages”). The fact that Browder re-
mained in jail for three years is far from routine. Most defendants in his shoes accede to 
the pressure to plead guilty—even if innocent—if it means immediate release from 
Rikers. See Gonnerman, Before the Law (cited in note 7) (“In 2011, in the Bronx, only a 
hundred and sixty-five felony cases went to trial; in three thousand nine hundred and 
ninety-one cases, the defendant pleaded guilty.”). 
 10 See Randal John Meyer, Despite Public Outrage, Bail Reform Still Needed in 
New York City (Huffington Post, Feb 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ZM8H-M73Q; 
Alysia Santo, No Bail, Less Hope: The Death of Kalief Browder (Marshall Project, June 9, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H79F-ZA4P. 
 11 Rosenberg, Putting Fewer Innocents behind Bars (cited in note 5). 
 12 Jim Dwyer, A Life That Frayed as Bail Reform Withered (NY Times, June 9, 
2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/nyregion/after-a-shocking-death-a 
-renewed-plea-for-bail-reform-in-new-york-state.html (visited Nov 9, 2017) (Perma ar-
chive unavailable) (explaining that Browder’s story is an indictment of the criminal jus-
tice system broadly and not simply a story of failures at Rikers Island). In January 2016, 
President Barack Obama retold Browder’s story while announcing a federal solitary-
confinement ban for juveniles in federal facilities. See Barack Obama, Barack Obama: 
Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement (Wash Post, Jan 25, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7GQR-8C5J. 
 13 See Part III.A (detailing current reforms). 
 14 See Kristin Bechtel, et al, Dispelling the Myths: What Policy Makers Need to 
Know about Pretrial Research *2 n 1 (Pretrial Justice Institute, Nov 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/C9RE-N9GY (explaining that the first wave of bail reform began in the 
1960s, the second in the 1980s, and the third in the early 2000s); Timothy R. Schnacke, 
Claire M.B. Brooker, and Michael R. Jones, The Third Generation of Bail Reform (Den-
ver U L Rev Online, Mar 14, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/F6MR-DZTU (discussing 
the interrelated factors that form the genesis of the third generation of bail reform). See 
also Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 Yale L J 490, 515 (2018) (explaining 
that the third-generation bail reform model “requires that judges have authority to order 
pretrial preventive detention”). 
 15 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 Geo Wash L Rev 417, 424 (2016) (ex-
plaining that, even in jurisdictions where judges employ actuarial tools to assess a de-
fendant’s risk of flight and/or dangerousness, most often judges “retain full discretion to 
detain the defendant”); John S. Goldkamp and E. Rely Vîlcică, Judicial Discretion 
and the Unfinished Agenda of American Bail Reform: Lessons from Philadelphia’s 
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to overestimate the risks posed by defendants on release,16 and 
because judges are notoriously risk averse, they err on the side 
of detaining or otherwise overmanaging defendants.17 
The proponents of risk-assessment tools assert that these 
tools address flaws in judicial decisionmaking by supplementing 
judicial decisionmaking, and countering judicial risk aversion, 
with objective science and data.18 On June 30, 2016, the Obama 
administration announced the Data-Driven Justice Initiative—a 
multifaceted, nationwide effort to reduce unnecessary pretrial 
detention.19 One of the initiative’s principal strategies is to “[u]se 
data-driven, validated, pre-trial risk assessment tools” to ensure 
that low-risk defendants are not detained before trial.20 The ini-
tiative endorsed a risk-assessment reform movement that has 
already gained significant momentum. There is widespread en-
thusiasm for the prospect of “moneyballing” pretrial deci-
sionmaking.21 By the time the Data-Driven Justice Initiative 
was announced, jurisdictions across the country were already 
using a range of different risk-assessment tools: a federal tool; 
state-specific tools used in Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Ohio, and 
 
Evidence-Based Judicial Strategy, in Austin Sarat, ed, Studies in Law, Politics, and 
Society: Special Issue New Perspectives on Crime and Criminal Justice 115, 127 
(Emerald 2009). 
 16 Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L 
Rev 837, 887–88 (describing judges’ tendency to overestimate pretrial risks). See also 
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 Cornell L Rev 1, 27–28 (2007) (explaining that judges “rely 
heavily on their intuitive faculties” and that they often cannot override their intuitions 
to clear the way for deliberative decisionmaking on the bench); Daniel Kahneman, 
Thinking, Fast and Slow 300–02 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2013) (explaining that, gener-
ally, downside risks have much higher salience than upside gains). 
 17 See Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Developing a National Model for 
Pretrial Risk Assessment *1 (Nov 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/YB6U-3KEY (noting 
that judges’ subjective evaluations are not reliable risk assessments). 
 18 See, for example, id at *2 (describing the tools as facilitating a shift away “from a 
system based solely on instinct and experience to one in which judges have access to sci-
entific, objective risk assessment tools”); Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 888 (cited in note 
16) (“Risk assessment tools address some of these concerns [of unconscious bias and 
overestimation] by replacing reliance on subjective and intuitive judicial measures of 
risk with more objective data that is insulated from cognitive bias.”). 
 19 See Launching the Data-Driven Justice Initiative (cited in note 1). The initiative 
is a “bipartisan coalition,” with support from many organizations. Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Anne Milgram, Moneyballing Criminal Justice (The Atlantic, June 20, 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/YU9K-LRGV. “Moneyballing” refers to the practice of using 
statistical analysis to achieve better and more efficient results. Id. The term is originally 
derived from a 2003 book about the Oakland Athletics’ use of an innovative method of 
data and statistical analysis to assemble a winning team on a limited budget. See gener-
ally Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (Norton 2003). 
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Virginia; and a free tool developed by the Laura and John 
Arnold Foundation that has been adopted in about thirty-eight 
jurisdictions across the country, including three states (New 
Jersey, Kentucky, and Arizona).22 The foundation has pledged to 
continue the initiative’s work even if the Trump administration 
discontinues it.23 
An elusive issue, unsolved by past generations of bail re-
formers, threatens the new reform efforts’ success: ambiguity 
regarding the risks that judges who set money bail or order pre-
trial detention are trying to mitigate or avoid. Even as scholars, 
reformers, and practitioners are showing renewed interest in 
pretrial detention and bail,24 there is little focus on one central 
question: the appropriate meaning and role of what is often 
called “flight risk.”25 What judges, attorneys, and scholars fre-
quently describe in shorthand terms as “flight risk” is defined in 
older statutes and in newer risk-assessment tools in significant-
ly broader terms: the risk that a defendant will fail to appear for 
a future court date. 
Scholars,26 judges,27 and legislative drafters28 often use flight 
and nonappearance interchangeably. But these terms are not 
 
 22 Public Safety Assessment (Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Feb 5, 2017), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/TW2H-NN5Y. The Arnold Foundation estimated in 2015 that 
approximately 10 percent of courts in the United States had adopted a risk-assessment 
tool. Id. See also Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 867 (cited in note 16) (noting that the use 
of risk-assessment tools is “rapidly growing”). 
 23 Laura and John Arnold Foundation to Continue Data-Driven Criminal Justice 
Effort Launched under the Obama Administration (Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation, Jan 23, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Q887-2LXV. The foundation 
pledged to “dramatically expand[ ] its efforts to use data and analytics in order to ad-
dress challenges in the criminal justice system” and explained that two former White 
House advisors who played key roles in Obama’s initiative had joined the foundation 
to continue their work. Id. 
 24 See Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 420 (cited in note 15) (documenting a 
drop-off in bail-related scholarship after United States v Salerno but noting a recent 
resurgence of interest). See also, for example, Shima Baradaran and Frank L. 
McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 Tex L Rev 497, 507–13 (2012) (analyzing factors rel-
evant to pretrial “dangerousness” predictions); Shima Baradaran, Restoring the 
Presumption of Innocence, 72 Ohio St L J 723, 738–39 (2011) (tracing the erosion of 
the pretrial presumption of innocence). 
 25 See Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 421 (cited in note 15) (“Flight risk—the 
other chief factor in bail decisionmaking—has been largely ignored.”). 
 26 See, for example, id at 442–46 (using flight risk and nonappearance interchange-
ably); Baradaran and McIntyre, 90 Tex L Rev at 545–48 (cited in note 24) (generally de-
scribing all nonappearance risks as “flight risk”). Criminologists supply additional ambi-
guity, using the term “fugitive” in similarly inconsistent ways. See Part I.A. 
 27 See Part II.C (analyzing cases and highlighting references to both flight and 
nonappearance). 
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coextensive. Flight risk is properly assigned to defendants who 
are expected to flee a jurisdiction. This is a small, and arguably 
shrinking,29 subcategory of a much larger group of defendants 
who pose risks of nonappearance.30 
This Article calls for nuance in the definition of 
nonappearance and flight, both in actuarial risk-assessment 
tools and in bail reform efforts more broadly. Constitutional and 
statutory requirements demand precision about these distinc-
tions. In other work, I have asserted that disentangling flight 
risk and nonappearance from dangerousness will be essential to 
successful bail reform.31 This Article builds on that contention by 
isolating the appearance-related pretrial risks that judges seek 
to measure and manage and then highlighting fundamental 
problems with the definition of those risks. 
Clarifying these muddy risk descriptions requires taking a 
step back to delineate the harms posed by various forms of non-
appearance. This Article proposes dividing the broad category of 
“nonappearing defendants” (or defendants who fail to appear) 
into three subcategories. The first subcategory of true flight 
comprises defendants who flee the jurisdiction. The other two 
subcategories are both local or nonflight forms of nonappear-
ance: defendants who remain in the jurisdiction but actively and 
persistently avoid court, described as local absconders, and de-
fendants who remain in the jurisdiction but whose failures to 
appear are more preventable in advance and less costly after the 
fact, termed low-cost nonappearances. These subcategories differ 
in nature and not merely by degree.32 Defendants in these sub-
categories impose distinct systemic costs and call for different 
types of supervision and management. The distinctions between 
these groups turn on the intent of the actor, the persistence of 
the nonappearance, the difficulty (for the jurisdiction) of locating 
 
 28 See Part II.B (reviewing discussions of flight and nonappearance in federal and 
state statutes). 
 29 Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 Yale 
L J 1344, 1352–53 (2014) (explaining that technological advances make fleeing less effec-
tive in avoiding trial). 
 30 In this Article, “nonappearance risk” is used interchangeably with the risk that a 
defendant will “fail to appear.” 
 31 See generally Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev 837 (cited in note 16). 
 32 Risk-assessment tools place defendants into tiers of nonappearance risk (gener-
ally ranking them), but scaling nonappearance risk does not account for the differences 
between the categories. See Part III.B (describing the operation of risk-assessment 
tools). For example, someone who poses a very high risk of nonappearance is not the 
same as someone who poses a true flight risk. 
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him or her, and the specific types of pretrial interventions that 
might be appropriate to ensure appearance.33 
Ideally, risk-assessment tools would help judges identify 
which defendants are likely to fall into these subcategories. Un-
fortunately, the tools currently available do not define, measure, 
or guide judges about how to manage these separate risks. In-
stead, current risk-assessment tools treat all nonappearances 
equally and produce risk numbers that do not adequately ac-
count for a court’s ability to manage and mitigate pretrial flight 
and nonappearance risk.34 Although current reform efforts are 
focused on identifying less intrusive and lower-cost interven-
tions that can effectively manage pretrial risks, those efforts (in-
cluding, in particular, the risk-assessment tools that have been 
developed) are hobbled by vague and overly general descriptions 
of nonappearance risk. A more nuanced understanding of these 
differences will be a key piece of broader efforts to reduce judi-
cial reliance on pretrial detention and to mitigate the risks 
posed by defendants on release. Ensuring that practitioners and 
judges have a greater appreciation for these distinctions may al-
so improve outcomes in individual cases. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the problem 
of pretrial nonappearance, detailing the inconsistent descrip-
tions of the problem, highlighting data deficits, and outlining 
costs. This Part also highlights the connection between pretrial 
nonappearance and the overwhelming backlogs of outstanding 
warrants (many of which are bench warrants for failures to ap-
pear for court) in jurisdictions across the country. Part II 
analyzes the governing legal framework, including constitution-
al protections against excessive pretrial restraint, federal and 
state statutory requirements that govern pretrial assessments of 
flight and other nonappearance risks, and judicial decisions ap-
plying those statutes. Part III evaluates how modern risk-
assessment tools fit into broader reform efforts, how those tools 
predict nonappearance, and why they define and predict non-
appearance only in vague and overly general terms. 
Finally, Part IV outlines a new nonappearance taxonomy 
that divides the broad category of nonappearance into the three 
separate subcategories mentioned above: those who flee the ju-
risdiction, local absconders, and low-cost local nonappearances. 
 
 33 See Part IV. 
 34 See Part III.B. 
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At least some judges making pretrial-detention decisions have 
implicitly drawn some of these distinctions between true flight 
risk and other nonappearance risks, but an explicit and detailed 
account of these distinctions is overdue. Part IV closes by sum-
marizing how this taxonomy advances the larger objective: iden-
tifying less intrusive and lower-cost interventions than those 
currently used in most jurisdictions, which can more efficiently 
and fairly manage the full range of nonappearance and flight 
risks. 
I.  FUGITIVES, FLIGHT, AND NONAPPEARANCE: DEFINING 
PROBLEMS AND RISKS 
For centuries, judges have understood that—in order to 
guarantee that justice is administered and to promote efficiency 
in the process—they must ensure that criminal defendants will 
appear for future court appearances.35 Despite this long history, 
little attention has been devoted to defining flight risk and to 
distinguishing flight from other types of nonappearance.36 
More-rigorous thinking about nonappearance is essential for 
several reasons. First, although concerns about predicting future 
offending behavior understandably dominate the current reform 
conversation, stakeholders also clearly care about the costs of 
nonappearance: a defendant’s history of nonappearance weighs 
heavily in actuarial risk calculations.37 Second, as release rates 
rise with the implementation of reform, rates of nonappearance 
will also rise. The sustainability of reform depends on maintain-
ing acceptable appearance rates. Finally, as outlined in more de-
tail in Part IV.C, efforts to better define the nature and causes 
of various forms of nonappearance force engagement with other 
fundamental questions about the criminal justice system, in-
cluding questions about what we criminalize and who we arrest. 
 
 35 See Stack v Boyle, 342 US 1, 5 n 3 (1951) (explaining that bail should be set to 
“insure the presence of the defendant”). See also Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the 
Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 Wash & Lee 
L Rev 1297, 1335 (2012) (“[A]lthough the specific intent of the Framers regarding bail 
cannot be conclusively determined, all the available evidence points to the fact that pre-
trial detention, both under English common law and at the time the Constitution was 
written, was limited to flight risks.”). 
 36 See notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 37 See, for example, Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 451 (cited in note 15) (discuss-
ing Virginia’s pretrial risk-assessment tool, which considers whether the defendant has 
two or more FTAs, among other factors). 
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This Part contributes to the pretrial-release literature by 
identifying: (i) the mix of terms that are currently used (incon-
sistently) to describe various sorts of nonappearance problems; 
(ii) the data that are available about the scope of the problem of 
nonappearance; and (iii) the general costs of various forms of 
nonappearance, both for the system and for nonappearing de-
fendants, their families, and their communities. 
A. Misdescribing the Problem(s) 
Legislators, judges, scholars, and reformers define and de-
scribe the risk that a defendant will not appear for future court 
appearances in different and inconsistent ways. To some ex-
tent, the different terminologies acknowledge that some non-
appearances are more problematic than others; for example, a 
defendant who flees the jurisdiction is more costly to recover 
than one who fails to appear but stays local. Put in risk terms, 
then, a flight risk should be more serious than a nonflight risk. 
Statutes frequently direct judges to predict whether a de-
fendant will “appear” and to set release conditions that will en-
sure appearance.38 The federal statute and some state statutes 
refer to both flight risk and other forms of nonappearance risk, 
drawing at least an implicit distinction.39 Although several 
 
 38 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(c) (instructing federal judges to impose condi-
tions of release that will “reasonably assure the appearance” of a defendant released pre-
trial); Cal Penal Code § 1275(a)(1): 
In setting, reducing, or denying bail, a judge or magistrate shall take into con-
sideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged, 
the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her 
appearing at trial or at a hearing of the case. The public safety shall be the 
primary consideration. 
See also, for example, Tenn Code Ann § 40-11-115(b) (“In determining whether or not a 
person shall be released . . . the magistrate shall take into account: . . . (8) Any other fac-
tors indicating the defendant’s ties to the community or bearing on the risk of willful 
failure to appear.”); Ind Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a): 
[A] court may admit a defendant to bail and impose any of the following condi-
tions to assure the defendant’s appearance at any stage of the legal proceed-
ings, or . . . (7) [r]elease the defendant on personal recognizance unless: 
(A) the state presents evidence relevant to a risk by the defendant: (i) of non-
appearance . . . and (B) the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the risk exists. 
 39 See 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A) (instructing judicial officers to take into account the 
defendant’s “family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the 
community, [and] community ties” as well as the defendant’s “record concerning appear-
ance at court proceedings,” among other characteristics). See also, for example, NY Crim 
Proc Law § 510.30(2)(a) (outlining that a court evaluating “the kind and degree of control 
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statutes highlight flight as a more “serious” problem, they pro-
vide no definitions.40 Most state statutes, like the federal 
statute, set out factors for judges to consider in evaluating 
nonappearance risk but do not identify which factors are specifi-
cally relevant to flight and which are relevant to other local (or 
nonflight) types of nonappearance.41 
Yet judges making bail determinations use the term “flight 
risk” to refer to all nonappearance risks, whether or not the in-
dividual is actually likely to flee the jurisdiction.42 Scholars and 
reformers do the same.43 In contrast, the new risk-assessment 
tools that aid judges making risk calculations use “appearance” 
language but do not mention or measure flight risk.44 But using 
either “flight” or “failure to appear” (FTA) so expansively elides 
significant distinctions between true flight, local absconding, 
and low-cost forms of nonappearance that are discussed in 
Part IV. 
Empirical studies of nonappearance introduce still more in-
consistent terminologies, including, for example, frequent refer-
ences to “fugitives.”45 Sometimes, the term “fugitive” is used, in 
keeping perhaps with more colloquial understandings, to identi-
fy an individual who has left the jurisdiction.46 At other times, 
being a fugitive is not contingent on any spatial or geographical 
movement. Instead, it turns on the passage of time: for instance, 
a fugitive may be someone who has failed to appear for more 
 
or restriction that is necessary to secure [a defendant’s] court attendance when required 
. . . must . . . consider and take into account” a defendant’s “previous record if any in re-
sponding to court appearances when required or with respect to flight to avoid criminal 
prosecution”); Fla Stat § 903.046(2) (explaining that in setting bail or conditions of re-
lease courts “shall consider,” among other things, “[t]he defendant’s past and present 
conduct, including any record of convictions, previous flight to avoid prosecution, or fail-
ure to appear at court proceedings”). 
 40 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(f)(2)(A); 18 USC § 3142(b) (failing to define 
what it means that a release would not “reasonably assure the appearance of the person 
as required”). 
 41 See 18 USC § 3142(g). See also note 39. 
 42 See Part II.C. 
 43 See note 26. 
 44 See Part III.B. 
 45 See, for example, Thomas H. Cohen and Brian A. Reaves, Pretrial Release of 
Felony Defendants in State Courts *8–10 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nov 2007), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/6C8R-WSVU; John S. Goldkamp, Fugitive Safe Surrender: An 
Important Beginning, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol 429, 429–30 (2012). 
 46 See, for example, 18 USC § 1073. The federal fugitive statute targets a fugitive 
that “moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce” with the intent to avoid prose-
cution or arrest. 18 USC § 1073. 
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than one year.47 Although an imperfect proxy, this temporal dis-
tinction may reflect the intention or willfulness one might asso-
ciate with a fugitive. Intention or willfulness, however, is not a 
universally accepted aspect of the definition of a “fugitive”—
there are references elsewhere in the literature to “inadvertent” 
and “unintentional” fugitives.48 Nor is the label “fugitive” re-
served for those who are actively sought by the government.49 
Terminology, however, is only part of the problem. Even 
when labels are agreed on, there are major issues with the accu-
racy and significance of the data that are collected about non-
appearances. What does it mean to have an FTA on your record? 
Different jurisdictions apply different standards for measuring 
and recording what qualifies as an FTA or nonappearance. In a 
2011 Pretrial Justice Institute report, Cynthia Mamalian docu-
mented the inconsistencies: 
In some jurisdictions, if the defendant fails to appear for 
court, he is immediately assigned a[n] FTA status. In other 
jurisdictions, if the defendant fails to appear, the family is 
called, the defendant is given another chance, and the de-
fendant’s case is only considered a[n] FTA if a warrant is ul-
timately issued.50 
If a defendant has an FTA on his record, that will have a 
significant impact on whether he will be released before trial 
 
 47 In Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that use data from the State Court 
Processing Statistics program, defendants are deemed “fugitives” if they do not return to 
court within a year “irrespective if they remained in the local jurisdiction or fled to a dif-
ferent state [or] county.” Thomas H. Cohen, Administrative Office of the US Courts, 
Office of Probation & Pretrial Services, Email to Lauryn P. Gouldin, Syracuse University 
College of Law (Jan 24, 2017) (“Cohen Email”) (on file with author). See also Cohen and 
Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts at *8–10 (cited in note 45) 
(discussing fugitive status for purposes of pretrial release). 
 48 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 430 (cited in note 45) (discussing the 
phenomenon of “inadvertent fugitives”); David M. Bierie, National Public Registry of 
Active-Warrants: A Policy Proposal, 79 Fed Probation 27, 27–28 (2015) (describing de-
fendants who are unaware of outstanding warrants as “unintentional fugitives”). 
 49 Professor Alice Goffman notes that, at least in some communities, residents tend 
to “draw . . . distinctions between those likely to be taken into custody if the authorities 
do a general sweep, and those for whom the authorities are aggressively searching.” 
Alice Goffman, On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City 7 (Chicago 2014). 
 50 Cynthia A. Mamalian, State of the Science of Pretrial Risk Assessment *27 
(Pretrial Justice Institute, Mar 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/Y9HF-QCZZ, citing 
Pretrial Justice Institute, Pretrial Justice in America: A Survey of County Pretrial 
Release Policies, Practices and Outcomes *10 (2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/37AB-68ZN. 
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and what conditions may be imposed if he is released.51 Prior 
FTAs have always been significant to judges as part of a mix of 
factors that might predict the likelihood of flight or other forms 
of nonappearance.52 In the risk-assessment tools that are in-
creasingly being used across the country, prior FTAs are displac-
ing other factors, becoming the primary determinant of a de-
fendant’s nonappearance risk score.53 
B. Data: How Many Missing Defendants? 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity in terminology, some facts 
are evident from the available data. Estimates for the numbers 
of felony defendants who fail to appear for scheduled court ap-
pearances vary, but data from 2009 indicate that the vast major-
ity (83 percent) of felony defendants who are released before tri-
al appear for all scheduled court appearances.54 The remaining 
17 percent missed at least one scheduled court appearance, with 
13 percent (of the total number) returning to court within one 
year.55 Only 3 percent of all released felony defendants remained 
a “fugitive” after a year.56 These numbers represent a significant 
decline compared to earlier studies; in 1996, nearly one-fourth of 
all felony defendants had at least one nonappearance.57 
 
 51 See Part II.C.4.a (highlighting the significance of prior nonappearance in both 
statutes and risk-assessment tools); Part III.B (same). 
 52 See Part II.C (reviewing factors specified in state and federal statutes that judg-
es use to predict nonappearance risk). 
 53 See Part III.B.2 (describing the emphasis in modern tools on prior FTAs). 
 54 Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009—Statistical 
Tables *21 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dec 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/U4RC 
-4WER. Reaves indicates that “[d]ata on the court appearance record and fugitive status 
were available for 95.1% of cases involving a defendant released prior to disposition.” Id. 
Other, older studies estimate rates of nonappearance as high as one-third for felony de-
fendants. Daniel J. Flannery and Jeff M. Kretschmar, Fugitive Safe Surrender: Program 
Description, Initial Findings, and Policy Implications, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol 437, 453 
(2012) (citing a 1999 study of New York City bench warrants). FTA rates also vary by “ju-
risdiction and offense type.” Brian H. Bornstein, et al, Reducing Courts’ Failure-to-Appear 
Rate by Written Reminders, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L 70, 70 (2013). 
 55 Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties at *21 (cited in note 54). 
 56 Id (explaining that the “detail” (13 and 3 percent) may not add up to the total 
(17 percent) because of rounding). See also id (“All defendants who failed to appear in 
court and were not returned to the court during the 1-year study period were counted 
as fugitives.”). 
 57 Id at *15 (observing that the 2009 data was roughly equivalent to 2006 percent-
ages “but lower than the 24% rate observed prior to 1996”). See also Eric Helland and 
Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement 
from Bail Jumping, 47 J L & Econ 93, 109 (2004). 
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Nonappearance rates for those charged with lower-level fel-
onies and misdemeanors are typically higher than for defend-
ants charged with higher-level felonies.58 In 2009, for example, 
“failure-to-appear rates were lowest for murder (5%) and rape 
(7%) defendants, and highest for those released after being 
charged with motor vehicle theft (28%).”59 
Over time and in jurisdictions across the country, pretrial 
nonappearance rates have created significant backlogs of out-
standing warrants.60 Bench warrants for defendants who fail to 
appear for court “often represent a large proportion of a jurisdic-
tion’s open warrants.”61 
Although data about open warrants are imperfect,62 they 
provide some perspective on the phenomenon of nonappearance. 
Information from the National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC) Wanted Person file indicates that on any given day in 
the United States, there are “over two million active criminal 
warrants.”63 In her 2016 dissent in Utah v Strieff,64 in which she 
observed that “[o]utstanding warrants are surprisingly com-
mon,”65 Justice Sonia Sotomayor cited state warrant data put-
ting the total number of outstanding warrants much higher, at 
 
 58 Bornstein, et al, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 70 (cited in note 54); Meagan 
Cahill, Focusing on the Individual in Warrant-Clearing Efforts, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol 
473, 478 (2012). 
 59 Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties at *15 (cited in note 54). 
 60 See Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 478 (cited in note 58) (“The failure-to-appear 
problem cannot be overlooked in any effort to address a jurisdiction’s warrant backlog.”). 
See also Kenneth Howe and Erin Hallissy, When Justice Goes Unserved: Thousands 
Wanted on Outstanding Warrants—but Law Enforcement Largely Ignores Them (SF 
Gate, June 22, 1999), archived at http://perma.cc/PTA7-R5GS (describing the backlog in 
California as of 1999 of “more than 2.5 million unserved warrants” and explaining that 
bench warrants for suspects who “failed to appear for their court dates” have “caused the 
number of warrants to balloon”). Warrant backlogs include warrants for other “wanted 
persons” including complaint and indictment warrants for suspects who have not yet 
been arrested, parole violation warrants, warrants for other individuals who have es-
caped from government custody, and criminal summonses, among others. Greg Hager, et 
al, Improved Coordination and Information Could Reduce the Backlog of Unserved 
Warrants *4–7 (Kentucky Legislative Research Commission Research Report No 326, 
July 14, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/STE4-U2HJ. 
 61 Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 478 (cited in note 58). 
 62 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 437 (cited in note 54) (“The 
exact number of outstanding felony and misdemeanor warrants in local jurisdictions is 
unknown.”). 
 63 Bierie, 79 Fed Probation at 27 (cited in note 48). See also David M. Bierie, 
Fugitives in the United States, 42 J Crim Just 327, 330 (2014) (“The data showed there 
were a total of 1.95 million active warrants in NCIC [in April 2011].”). 
 64 136 S Ct 2056 (2016). 
 65 Id at 2068 (Sotomayor dissenting). 
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over 7.8 million.66 The discrepancy is partially driven by the fact 
that the state data include more misdemeanors and other types 
of warrants (including civil, traffic, and juvenile warrants) that 
are not included in the NCIC Wanted Person file.67 
The bulk of the warrant backlog is for low-level offenses. 
Only 725,000 of the 7.8 million records cited by Sotomayor are 
for felonies68 and only 100,000 of those involve “serious violent 
crime.”69 Researchers have established that in some jurisdic-
tions, up to 75 percent of warrants for FTA are for traffic offens-
es.70 Close examination of warrant backlogs in jurisdictions like 
Ferguson, Missouri, raise real questions about the incentives to 
generate warrants and how overuse of warrants affects commu-
nities.71 In Ferguson, the Department of Justice found that six-
teen thousand people in a population of twenty-one thousand—
more than 76 percent—had outstanding warrants, most for traf-
fic offenses or other municipal-ordinance violations.72 
Disproportionately large numbers of outstanding warrants 
for low-level offenses and infractions clearly reflect systemic dys-
function. Without more information about the front-end process-
es for generating bench warrants or the back-end processes for 
resolving them, warrant backlog data provide little in the way of 
illumination about whether nonappearance is the problem or the 
product of other problems, such as overcriminalization, the 
 
 66 Id at 2066 (Sotomayor dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s holding that the dis-
covery of an outstanding warrant served as an “intervening circumstance” between the 
clearly unlawful stop of Edward Strieff and the search that followed his subsequent ar-
rest), citing US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State 
Criminal History Information Systems, 2014 *38 (Dec 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/C45D-W83Y (Table 5a). 
 67 Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2014 at *38 (cited in note 
66) (Table 5a). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Bierie, 79 Fed Probation at 27 (cited in note 48). See also Rachel A. Harmon, 
Why Arrest?, 115 Mich L Rev 307, 348 (2016) (arguing that summonses could replace ar-
rest warrants even for those accused of committing serious violent felonies). 
 70 Bierie, 42 J Crim Just at 328 (cited in note 63): 
[A prior study] examined one year’s worth of warrants in local crime data-
bases of two counties and found that court violations (e.g., failure to appear) 
accounted for just over half of warrants present. They also found that ap-
proximately 75% of those court violations were for traffic offenses. However, 
there is no larger research to date describing warrants across crime types or 
other categorizations. 
 71 US Department of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department *55 
(Mar 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U367-SFSQ (“Ferguson’s municipal court is-
sues arrest warrants at a rate that police officials have called . . . ‘staggering.’”). 
 72 Id at *6, 55. 
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poverty of arrestees, or the difficulty of navigating the 
cumbersome pretrial process.73 The problems with existing da-
ta reinforce this Article’s central claim: putting all types of 
nonappearance and all bench warrants in the same bucket 
muddies these waters, making solutions harder to find and 
potentially obscuring the government’s contribution to the 
problem. 
Concerns about the numbers of outstanding warrants and 
at-large fugitives are not new. The US Senate held hearings and 
issued a report on the national fugitive problem in 2000.74 But 
little has been done to measure and document the problem, let 
alone to resolve it, since.75 As Professor David Bierie has ex-
plained, “[m]ore than a decade later,” the problem is “essentially 
unchanged, with scholars lamenting ‘how little is known about 
the fugitive phenomenon—including attributes as simple as the 
actual volume of fugitives either per year or currently active in 
all justice systems in the United States.’”76 By bringing attention 
to the critical—but previously unexamined—definitional prob-
lems that must be addressed as prerequisites for successful 
analysis and reform, this Article provides the necessary founda-
tion for successful reforms and includes a preliminary research 
agenda to address these significant data deficits. 
C. The Costs of Nonappearance and Flight 
Before moving into the legal framework that governs the 
pretrial process, we should translate some of these observations 
about the scale of the pretrial nonappearance problem into 
thoughts about costs.77 This Section addresses systemic costs, 
then shifts to the costs and impacts on nonappearing 
 
 73 Recent efforts to reform the summons process in New York City reflect aware-
ness that both the overall volume of summonses and the complexity of the summons pro-
cess contribute to high rates of nonappearance. See Summons Reform (Mayor’s Office of 
Criminal Justice), archived at http://perma.cc/JF4H-VC2B (“Nearly four in ten sum-
monses issued resulted in a warrant for failure to appear in court, which may affect the 
likelihood of future detention.”). 
 74 See generally Fugitives: The Chronic Threat to Safety, Law, and Order, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary 
of the Senate, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (2000) (“Senate Hearings on Fugitives”). 
 75 Bierie, 42 J Crim Just at 328 (cited in note 63). 
 76 Id, quoting Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 430 (cited in note 45). 
 77 See Parts IV.A–B (proposing a new taxonomy of nonappearance and flight and 
considering the costs of various types of nonappearance). 
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defendants, and finally identifies some ways that current prac-
tices are counterproductive. 
Defendants who fail to appear for court impose costs on the 
system that are traditionally described in broad, sweeping 
terms. Across jurisdictions, the government has “a substantial 
interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available 
for trials.”78 For more serious crimes, the interest is more com-
pelling.79 Evading justice is described as an affront to every pur-
pose of punishment: 
A fugitive’s flight erodes the deterrent effect of sanctions by 
lowering the probability of catching the offender and by re-
ducing the present value of punishment. Fugitive flight de-
lays incapacitation, because criminals “on the lam” enjoy 
the opportunity to commit additional offenses. Their flight 
also denies society the opportunity to exact retribution for 
the offender’s crime.80 
The judiciary has a related institutional interest in “safe-
guarding the integrity of the adjudication process.”81 High vol-
umes of nonappearances may suggest to the public 
that the courts are dysfunctional and unable to deliver jus-
tice—to victims or defendants. In short, a court system that 
cannot ensure that defendants will refrain from crime, at-
tend court as required, and protect victims, witnesses, or ju-
rors has difficulty protecting the integrity of the judicial 
process and ultimately its legitimacy.82 
 
 78 Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 534 (1979) (“[T]he Government has a substantial in-
terest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available for trials and, ultimately, 
for service of their sentences, [and] confinement of such persons pending trial is a legiti-
mate means of furthering that interest.”). 
 79 See Goldkamp and Vîlcică, Judicial Discretion and the Unfinished Agenda of 
American Bail Reform at 131–32 (cited in note 15) (describing judges’ views that the 
seriousness of the charge is tied to the cost of “mistakes that could be made in making 
release decisions”). 
 80 Thomas J. Miles, Estimating the Effect of America’s Most Wanted: A 
Duration Analysis of Wanted Fugitives, 48 J L & Econ 281, 281 (2005). Premised on 
the evasion of justice, Professor Thomas J. Miles’s analysis here assumes the guilt of 
the fugitive. See id. 
 81 E. Rely Vîlcică and John S. Goldkamp, Bail Prediction: Exploring the Role of 
Neighborhood Context in Philadelphia, 42 Crim Just & Behav 1159, 1161 (2015). 
 82 Id. See also Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 430 (cited in note 45) (“[T]he fu-
gitive problem . . . has great significance for deterrence and the courts. The numbers of 
those intentionally avoiding court demonstrate the weakness in any intended deterrent 
message from the courts.”). 
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The costs imposed on the system by nonappearing defend-
ants, however, vary with the nonappearance’s nature and per-
sistence. Those who flee the jurisdiction impose different costs 
than those who remain in the jurisdiction.83 And persistent non-
appearances are more costly than short-term nonappearances.84 
The costs of managing nonappearance risks (that is, of prevent-
ing nonappearance) also vary. These differences drive this Arti-
cle’s proposed division of nonappearance into subcategories, as 
discussed below.85 
The final set of costs is the impacts on nonappearing de-
fendants and their families and communities.86 Defendants with 
outstanding warrants may avoid “secur[ing] legitimate and sta-
ble employment” because of the fear of detection and arrest.87 
They will also “have difficulty obtaining a driver’s license, [and] 
cannot legally obtain public benefits.”88 
Criminologists also describe the direct impacts of outstand-
ing bench warrants on a defendant’s physical and mental well 
being.89 In On the Run, her ethnography of life with the “Sixth 
Street Boys” in Philadelphia, Professor Alice Goffman details 
the cumulative impacts on the young men she observes of “dip-
ping and dodging” to avoid police and outstanding warrants.90 As 
Goffman explains, in addition to closing off opportunities for ed-
ucation and legitimate employment, this is a lifestyle that se-
verely strains relationships with friends and family.91 
 
 83 See Part IV.A (defining “true flight risks”). 
 84 See Part IV.B.2.b (analyzing the significance of the persistence or duration of 
nonappearance). 
 85 See Part IV. 
 86 Of course, from the defendant’s perspective, these costs may pale in comparison 
to the costs of showing up, which may include getting convicted, being sentenced, and 
being deported. 
 87 Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 476 (cited in note 58) (“Outstanding warrants . . . 
[may] lead to additional illegal actions by cutting off individuals from legitimate sources 
of income or activity or by making them potential victims who are less likely to report 
their victimization to authorities for fear of the risk to themselves.”). See also Goffman, 
On the Run at 52 (cited in note 49) (“[A man on the run] doesn’t show up at the hospital 
when his child is born, nor does he seek medical help when he is badly beaten. He 
doesn’t seek formal employment. . . . He avoids calling the police when harmed or using 
the courts to settle disputes.”). 
 88 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 439 (cited in note 54). 
 89 Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 476 (cited in note 58) (“Having an outstanding 
warrant (or even simply believing that one has a warrant) can cause significant levels of 
individual- and family-level stress.”). 
 90 Goffman, On the Run at 6, 186 (cited in note 49). 
 91 Id at 52–53. See also Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 439 (cit-
ed in note 54) (“The threat of going to jail can affect their close relationships and weaken 
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In one study of a years-long project (Fugitive Safe 
Surrender) to try to clear outstanding warrants and bring de-
fendants back into the justice system, researchers surveyed de-
fendants about why they turned themselves in voluntarily. The 
responses highlight many of the points made above: 
The most common reason cited for why individuals surren-
dered voluntarily was because they “want to get their driv-
er’s license,” as noted by nearly half of all respondents 
(47.1%), followed by “want to start over” (41.8%) and “fear of 
arrest” (39.4%). The next most common reasons for surren-
dering were “for my kids” (33.6%), “want to get a job” (33%), 
and “tired of running” (29.1%). Asked why they had not sur-
rendered before today, nearly 60% said they did not have 
money to pay bail or fines, but others noted being afraid: “I 
was afraid of what would happen to me” (36.5%) and “I 
didn’t want to go to jail” (37.2%) or “I didn’t want to get 
arrested” (28%).92 
These impacts on defendants translate into new communi-
ty problems. Fear of additional punishment for failing to ap-
pear, including fees and fines, reinforces a defendant’s desire 
or need to avoid court.93 Even initially inadvertent 
nonappearances can quickly become a persistent phenomenon. 
When nonappearances become persistent, those defendants risk 
becoming modern “outlaws,” persons who have been “put outside 
the sphere of legal protection,” and for whom “crime becomes a 
natural source of income.”94 This, in turn, creates a criminogenic 
environment in the community “through a sort of cyclical regenera-
tion of noncompliant individuals at the core of a criminal culture of 
resistance and disrespect.”95 Professor Alexander Tabarrok 
 
already tenuous attachments to family, work, and community.”); Alexander Tabarrok, 
Fugitives, Outlaws, and the Lessons of Safe Surrender, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol 461, 464 
(2012) (“Asociality, secrecy, and unpredictability become strategies to maintain liberty.”). 
 92 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 449 (cited in note 54). 
 93 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 429–30 (cited in note 45) (“Some [defendants] 
. . . simply cannot afford financially to turn themselves in.”). See also Alicia Bannon, 
Mitali Nagrecha, and Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry *13 
(Brennan Center for Justice, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/44VV-LMJH (“[U]npaid 
criminal justice debt puts individuals at risk of imprisonment and can impact everything 
from their employment and housing opportunities, to their financial stability, to their 
right to vote.”). 
 94 Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 462–63 (cited in note 91). 
 95 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 429–30 (cited in note 45) (describing this as a 
form of “deterrence ‘backfire’”). 
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explains that “the logic that encourages asociality and discour-
ages work, school, routine, and any interaction with the justice 
system [ ] pushes outlaws away from civil society when we most 
want logic to push them toward civil society.”96 
Taken together, the data about nonappearances and bench 
warrant backlogs, and the discussion of the costs of 
nonappearances, reveal serious pathologies in the current sys-
tem. These problems relate to how FTAs are logged, what they 
mean, and how they impact the future behavior of defendants. 
As outlined below, reforms that build on the existing system 
without addressing the cracks in this foundation are doomed to 
repeat current mistakes. 
II.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Ambiguity in the description and definition of 
nonappearance risks violates both constitutional and statutory 
provisions, which require a match between the means and ends 
of any pretrial restraint on liberty. The Constitution prohibits 
judges from imposing “excessive” restraints on liberty before tri-
al,97 and federal and state statutes similarly limit judges to im-
posing the “least restrictive” set of conditions that are necessary 
to manage risks of nonappearance.98 Employing vague, overly 
general risk descriptions significantly increases the likelihood of 
unconstitutional and costly overregulation. The government 
needs to know the risks it is regulating in order to abide by con-
stitutional and statutory requirements. 
A. The Constitutional Mandate 
A judge’s pretrial evaluation of nonappearance risk includes 
at least two steps. First, the judge evaluates whether a defend-
ant poses risks of flight or other forms of nonappearance. The 
judge is then empowered by federal and state bail statutes to 
impose conditions of release (if necessary) to manage these risks. 
In extreme cases, judges can detain defendants who pose other-
wise unmanageable risks.99 
 
 96 Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 464 (cited in note 91). 
 97 See Part II.A. 
 98 See Part II.B. 
 99 If the judge is unable to manage the risk of nonappearance using conditions of 
release, detention may be warranted. For example, as Professor Samuel R. Wiseman has 
observed, “No matter how ingenious the [electronic monitoring] technology, it is likely 
that highly motivated defendants will find a way to defeat it, perhaps by damaging or 
2018] Defining Flight Risk 697 
 
Judges traditionally managed flight and other forms of non-
appearance risk by imposing financial conditions of release, also 
called money bail.100 When money bail is imposed, a defendant or 
his sureties are required to put up money or property to obtain 
the defendant’s release from custody; the money or property is 
returned if the defendant successfully appears for subsequent 
court proceedings.101 This use of bail as an incentive to appear 
traces its roots to the colonial era.102 
Problems with judicial discretion in setting bail—and specif-
ically with the imposition of “excessive bail”—are centuries old. 
The British Habeas Corpus Act of 1679103 established some pro-
tections around bail but left the amount of bail to the “discre-
tions” of the magistrate.104 This created immediate problems: 
judges could ensure defendants’ detention “by deliberately set-
ting bail so high that the defendants could not pay.”105 The 
 
removing the tracking device or by blocking its signal.” Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1371 
(cited in note 29). These “highly motivated defendants” would qualify as the sort of “ex-
treme cases” cited in the text. Wiseman speculates, however, that under current practic-
es in many jurisdictions, these defendants may already be at risk of being detained for 
dangerousness. Id. 
 100 See Timothy R. Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial 
Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform *2 (National Institute of 
Corrections, Aug 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P4EL-XEP8 (“‘[B]ail’ [refers to] a 
process of releasing a defendant from jail . . . with [financial or nonfinancial] conditions 
set to provide reasonable assurance of court appearance or public safety.”). 
 101 Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 856 n 80 (cited in note 16). 
 102 The origins of bail can be traced back to medieval England, where bail in its ear-
liest forms was set to approximate the debt that a defendant might owe to a victim at the 
resolution of a case. See Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail at *26–28 (cited in note 100). 
See also Clara Kalhous and John Meringolo, Bail Pending Trial: Changing 
Interpretations of the Bail Reform Act and the Importance of Bail from Defense Attorneys’ 
Perspectives, 32 Pace L Rev 800, 803 (2012) (“Because the amount of the pledge was 
equal to the potential penalty upon conviction, the ‘system necessarily linked the amount 
of the pretrial pledge to the seriousness of the crime.’”), quoting June Carbone, Seeing 
through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the 
Administration of Bail, 34 Syracuse L Rev 517, 520 (1983). In the United States, howev-
er, bail has always been described as an incentive (and not as any sort of prepayment or 
approximation of liability). Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail at *40 (cited in note 100). 
 103 Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car II ch 2, reprinted in 5 Statutes of the 
Realm 935 (1819). 
 104 Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car II ch 2, reprinted in 5 Statutes of the Realm 
at 935 (cited in note 103). 
 105 Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984: 
The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 Fordham 
Urban L J 121, 127 (2009). See also Hermine Herta Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial 
Detention, 60 Georgetown L J 1139, 1189 (1972) (“By imposing excessive bail, the judges 
had made the Habeas Corpus Act inoperative with respect to those prisoners whom the 
King did not want to release.”). 
698 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:677 
 
English Bill of Rights of 1689106 addressed this pretextual use of 
bail by prohibiting “excessive bail.”107 The language from the 
English Bill of Rights became a model for the Eighth 
Amendment to the US Constitution, drafted a century later, 
which states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”108 
As Professor Samuel Wiseman has explained, we do not know 
much about the Framers’ intent regarding the term “excessive”: 
The only known remark addressing the proposed Excessive 
Bail Clause came from Mr. Livermore in the House of 
Representatives as part of a comment on the Eighth 
Amendment as a whole . . . . “The clause seems to express a 
great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objec-
tion to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not 
think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive 
bail? Who are to be the judges?”109 
 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given the Excessive 
Bail Clause very little attention; to date, it has provided only 
modest protection against pretrial detention.110 The Supreme 
Court first addressed the definition of “excessive” in Stack v 
Boyle,111 decided in 1951. As the Stack court explained: 
Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsi-
ble persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern 
practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of 
money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of 
the presence of an accused. Bail set at a figure higher than 
 
 106 English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 Wm & Mary sess 2, ch 2, reprinted in 6 Statutes 
of the Realm 142 (1819). 
 107 English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 Wm & Mary sess 2, ch 2, reprinted in 6 Statutes 
of the Realm at 143 (cited in note 106) (“[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required . . . .”). 
 108 US Const Amend VIII. 
 109 Wiseman, 36 Fordham Urban L J at 128 (cited in note 105) (tracing the history of 
the Excessive Bail Clause). See also id at 130 (“[The clause’s] complex and obscure histo-
ry . . . has made consensus over the precise function of the constitutional prohibition 
against excessive bail elusive.”). 
 110 Id at 123 (“There has been relatively little innovation in the law and scholarship 
on bail . . . since Salerno.”). See also United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 752–54 (1987) 
(first citing Stack v Boyle, 342 US 1, 5 (1951), and then citing Carlson v Landon, 342 US 
524, 545–46 (1952), as the only two previous Supreme Court cases addressing the 
Excessive Bail Clause). 
 111 342 US 1 (1951). 
2018] Defining Flight Risk 699 
 
an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 
“excessive” under the Eighth Amendment.112 
Over thirty years later, in its 1987 decision in United States 
v Salerno,113 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984114 against a facial challenge 
to its novel preventive (danger-based) detention provisions.115 
Although the Salerno decision focused principally on these pro-
visions, its interpretation of “excessive” under the Eighth 
Amendment is broadly applicable to nonappearance risk as well. 
The Salerno Court addressed the spare text of the Bail Clause 
and explained that the Clause’s “only arguable substantive limi-
tation . . . is that the Government’s proposed conditions of re-
lease or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived 
evil.”116 The Court elaborated on how excessiveness ought to be 
calculated: 
Of course, to determine whether the Government’s response 
is excessive, we must compare that response against the in-
terest the Government seeks to protect by means of that re-
sponse. Thus, when the Government has admitted that its 
only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a 
court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more.117 
The Court’s prior discussion in Stack indicated that this cal-
culation had to be an individualized one: “Since the function of 
bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant 
must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assur-
ing the presence of that defendant.”118 Read together, these deci-
sions support the claim that pretrial restrictions on liberty that 
 
 112 Id at 5. 
 113 481 US 739 (1987). 
 114 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1976, codified in various sections of Title 18. 
 115 See Salerno, 481 US at 746–49 (explaining that the challenged preventive deten-
tion provisions were “regulatory” in nature and deeming them reasonable because they 
furthered the government’s legitimate interest in the safety of the community). 
 116 Id at 754. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Stack, 342 US at 5. The Court granted petitioners’ motion to reduce bail after the 
trial court set bail based solely on the nature of the charge and without considering each 
defendant’s individual circumstances. Id. Modern bail litigation decisions ground this 
right to an “individualized hearing” in the Due Process Clause. See, for example, Jones v 
City of Clanton, 2015 WL 5387219, *2 (MD Ala). 
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are not tailored to the specific risk an arrestee presents are un-
constitutionally “excessive.”119 
This Article asserts that the inquiry into “excessiveness” re-
quires more finely drawn distinctions between flight risk and 
other forms of nonappearance risk. The government must also 
be precise in proposing restrictions (detention or conditions of 
release) to manage those risks.120 Although lower courts quote 
these passages from Stack and Salerno,121 their embrace of the 
broad concept of excessiveness has not translated into meaning-
ful limits on pretrial detention or money bail.122 This may be 
due, in part, to the “amorphous” nature of Salerno’s conception 
 
 119 Salerno, 481 US at 754. See also Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1393 (cited in 
note 29): 
At least an intermediate level of scrutiny is consistent with precedent and war-
ranted by the text and purpose of the Eighth Amendment. Applying this 
standard, the question is whether the use of money bail to ensure the defend-
ant’s presence at trial is excessive under Salerno—that is, substantially broad-
er than necessary to achieve the governmental interests at stake. 
See also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth 
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 Minn L Rev 571, 603 (2005) (ex-
plaining that the Stack language “implies a form of means proportionality—if a lower 
bail amount would suffice, any higher bail is excessive”). 
 120 The focus in Salerno was on whether detention was “excessive” in light of the 
public-safety concerns articulated in that case. The focus in this Article is on different 
forms of nonappearance risk, but similar specificity is constitutionally required for pre-
dicting different types of public-safety risk. See Salerno, 481 US at 751 (“When the 
Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identi-
fied and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, consistent 
with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that 
threat.”). 
 121 See, for example, Campbell v Johnson, 586 F3d 835, 842 (11th Cir 2009) (“To de-
termine whether bail is excessive, we must compare the terms of the bail against the in-
terest the government seeks to protect.”); Galen v County of Los Angeles, 477 F3d 652, 
662 (9th Cir 2007) (“Excessiveness cannot be determined by a general mathematical 
formula, but rather turns on the correlation between the state interests a judicial officer 
seeks to protect and the nature and magnitude of the bail conditions imposed in a par-
ticular case.”); United States v Scott, 450 F3d 863, 866 n 5 (9th Cir 2006) (“In some in-
stances—when flight would be irrational, such as when the crime involves a minor traf-
fic infraction—any amount of bail may be excessive because the bail amount would not 
serve the purpose of ensuring appearance in court to answer the charges.”). 
 122 See Criminal Justice Policy Program, Moving beyond Money: A Primer on Bail 
Reform *8 (Harvard Law School, Oct 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/T7S8-QV38 (ar-
guing that Stack’s “functional analysis of bail suggests that the Eighth Amendment im-
poses a sliding scale, linking constitutionally permissible bond amounts (or other condi-
tions of release) to the amount needed to incentivize particular defendants to appear at 
court proceedings,” but noting that “[i]n practice, [ ] the courts have not applied this 
Eighth Amendment principle in a way that has meaningfully constrained the use of 
bail”) (citation omitted). 
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of excessiveness.123 The advent of tools that promise a shift away 
from intuitive risk estimates and toward purportedly more pre-
cise risk calculations may offer opportunities to argue for more 
finely drawn measures of excessiveness in ways that were previ-
ously unsuccessful. 
B. Statutory Requirements 
Federal and state statutes also constrain pretrial 
decisionmaking. This Section details relevant federal statutory 
law and summarizes state approaches, focusing on statutory def-
initions of nonappearance risks and statutory limits on judicial-
ly imposed conditions of release. 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 begins by directing a judge to 
release a defendant prior to trial unless the judge “determines 
that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of 
the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other 
person or the community.”124 Language similar to the italicized 
text appears throughout the statute, which repeatedly tasks 
judges with evaluating and managing pretrial nonappearance 
risks.125 Many state statutes contain similar language.126 
The Bail Reform Act’s detention provisions seem to draw an 
important distinction between nonappearance risk broadly and 
risk of flight more specifically, although it is unclear precisely 
what the drafters envisioned. Under the statute, if the court de-
termines that there is a “serious risk that [the defendant] will 
flee,”127 the court may be able to detain the defendant until tri-
al.128 Before ordering detention, the court is required to hold a 
detention hearing to determine whether any conditions of re-
lease can reasonably manage the risks presented.129 The Act 
 
 123 Mayson, 127 Yale L J at 506 (cited in note 14). 
 124 18 USC § 3142(b) (emphasis added). 
 125 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(c) (requiring a judge to order the pretrial re-
lease of a defendant on personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond if “[the 
judge] determines that the release . . . will not reasonably assure the appearance of the 
[defendant] as required . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 126 See, for example, DC Code § 23-1322(b)(1) (“The judicial officer shall hold a hear-
ing to determine whether any condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably 
assure the appearance of the person . . . .”). 
 127 18 USC § 3142(f)(2)(A). 
 128 18 USC § 3142(d)(2), (e)(1) (contemplating both shorter- and longer-term pretrial 
detention). 
 129 18 USC § 3142(e)(1). For a detention hearing to be held, either the government 
or the judicial officer must move to hold the hearing. 18 USC § 3142(f)(2). The motion 
must be made by the government if the case involves a narrow list of violent crimes or 
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does not appear to permit a detention hearing based solely on 
general nonappearance risk,130 and the rule is clear: a detention 
hearing must be held in order to detain a defendant until trial.131 
The statute draws the distinction between flight and nonap-
pearance only with respect to detention; it does not otherwise 
distinguish or define the terms.132 
The Act limits judicial authority by generally requiring rea-
sonable assessments of risks and by permitting only the “least 
restrictive” conditions of release that are necessary to assure 
that defendants will appear.133 Specifically, the Act authorizes 
judges to impose conditions on released defendants that those 
judges view as necessary to “reasonably assure the appearance” 
of defendants at future court proceedings,134 but limits judicial 
discretion in that judges are required to choose “the least re-
strictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that 
such judicial officer determines will reasonably assure the ap-
pearance of the person as required and the safety of any other 
person and the community.”135 Many state statutes echo this 
least-restrictive-conditions provision of the federal statute.136 
C. Judicial Interpretations of Statutory Risk Factors 
Judges have traditionally relied on a series of statutorily 
prescribed factors to predict pretrial risks.137 The statutes typi-
cally do not specify whether a particular factor is relevant to 
 
crimes with severe maximum sentences, 18 USC § 3142(f)(1), but can be made either by 
the government or the judicial officer for cases that involve a “serious risk that [the de-
fendant] will flee,” 18 USC § 3142(f)(2)(A), or “a serious risk that [the defendant] will 
obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten . . . or attempt to threaten . . . a pro-
spective witness or juror,” 18 USC § 3142(f)(2)(B). 
 130 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(d)(2), (e)(1). The statute’s lack of clarity about 
the definitions of flight and nonappearance and the inconsistent use of these terms in 
other contexts make it difficult to state this with more certainty. 
 131 18 USC § 3142(e)(1). 
 132 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A). 
 133 18 USC § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
 134 18 USC § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
 135 18 USC § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
 136 See Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1395 n 229 (cited in note 29) (collecting state stat-
utes “that require the use of the least restrictive means”). 
 137 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(g); NY Crim Proc Law § 510.30(2)(a); Ohio Rev 
Code Ann § 2937.222(C); Tenn Code Ann § 40-11-115(b); Fla Stat Ann § 903.046(2). See 
also Baradaran and McIntyre, 90 Tex L Rev at 503–04 (cited in note 24) (describing the 
historical development of statutory risk factors). 
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flight risk or to public-safety risk.138 Nor do they meaningfully or 
consistently distinguish between risks of nonappearance or 
flight as proposed in Part IV. Judges applying these statutory 
factors describe their task in both ways: as ensuring a defend-
ant’s appearance and as preventing a defendant’s flight.139 In-
deed, judges talk in terms of “flight risk” even in states where 
the statutes discuss only nonappearance.140 Because these statu-
tory factors provide limited guidance and restraint, they give 
significant discretion to judges, who are imperfect agents.141 As 
jurisdictions contemplate legislative reforms and adopt risk-
assessment tools, they must clarify the continuing role of these 
factors in guiding judicial decisionmaking. More specific and 
careful consideration of the factors’ predictive utility is overdue. 
The following sections briefly review the traditional factors 
that have been relied on by judges as predictive of 
nonappearance or flight, organizing them into four broad catego-
ries: (i) factors that suggest incentives to flee the jurisdiction or 
to avoid court deliberately; (ii) those that suggest an ability to 
flee the jurisdiction; (iii) those that show a defendant’s connec-
tions or anchors to the jurisdiction (and thus discount flight 
risk); and (iv) those factors that, without suggesting flight from 
 
 138 See Part I.A. See also Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 865–66 (cited in note 16) 
(surveying state and federal laws that prescribe factors to be considered in pretrial deci-
sionmaking and concluding that “the statutes do not indicate which factors are relevant 
to flight risk and which are believed to predict dangerousness”). 
 139 See, for example, United States v Bustamante-Conchas, 557 Fed Appx 803, 806 
(10th Cir 2014) (describing conditions that will “protect against [defendant’s] risk of 
flight” and “reasonably assure [his] appearance”); Ex parte Castillo-Lorente, 420 SW3d 
884, 888–90 (Tex App 2014) (evaluating whether high bail set by trial court would “se-
cure the defendant’s presence at trial” and “deter [him] from fleeing the jurisdiction”); 
Hernandez v State, 669 SE2d 434, 435 (Ga App 2008) (“The trial court’s foremost consid-
eration when fixing the amount of bail should be the probability that the defendant, if 
freed, will appear at trial.”). 
 140 See, for example, Fry v State, 990 NE2d 429, 446 (Ind 2013) (ruling that a court 
can release a defendant on “his own personal recognizance, unless the state shows evi-
dence of a flight risk”), citing Ind Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a) (“[A] court may admit a defend-
ant to bail and impose any of the following conditions to assure the defendant’s appear-
ance at any stage of the legal proceedings, or . . . to assure the public’s physical safety.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 141 Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 438 (cited in note 15) (“Judges make pretrial 
release decisions with only weak legislative guidance, and this grant of discretion gives 
rise to agency costs.”) (citation omitted). In light of these concerns, Wiseman proposes 
taking discretion away from judges entirely. See id (insisting that “[t]he next wave of 
bail reform should aim not at guiding judges’ discretion, but at radically limiting it—a 
classic means of reducing certain agency costs”). 
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the jurisdiction, nevertheless raise concerns about the defend-
ant’s reliability or trustworthiness (to return to court). 
1. Incentives to flee the jurisdiction or avoid court. 
Courts frequently cite the first two statutory factors listed 
in the federal bail statute—the seriousness of the offense and 
the weight of the evidence—as giving defendants incentives to 
flee the jurisdiction or otherwise to avoid court.142 In the taxon-
omy that follows in Part IV, these factors might be expected to 
predict flight or local absconding. This analysis assumes that de-
fendants’ actual behavior matches their incentives; that is, that 
defendants with greater incentives actually flee or fail to appear 
at higher rates. As outlined below, several studies question the 
validity of those assumptions. 
a) Offense seriousness.  The seriousness of the offense of 
arrest is the factor that prosecutors and judges most frequently 
cite when claiming that a defendant poses a serious flight risk. 
The argument is straightforward: because more serious charges 
carry heavier penalties, defendants have increased incentives to 
flee. Both federal143 and state144 courts frequently repeat this 
claim. Federal and state statutory presumptions in favor of de-
tention for certain types of offenses also rely on this argument.145 
Indeed, the seriousness of the alleged offense is the sole factor 
that determines money bail in jurisdictions with preset bail 
schedules.146 
 
 142 18 USC § 3142(g)(1)–(2). 
 143 See, for example, United States v English, 629 F3d 311, 320 (2d Cir 2011) (up-
holding a detention order by a district-court judge who would have granted a bail motion 
had the defendant not been charged with both firearm and drug offenses); United States 
v Timley, 236 Fed Appx 441, 442 (10th Cir 2007) (endorsing the district court’s detention 
order for a defendant facing a mandatory life sentence because of the high incentive to 
flee); United States v Craven, 1998 WL 196622, *2 (1st Cir) (finding that the potential 
penalties give the defendant “a greater incentive to flee”). 
 144 See, for example, Sneed v State, 946 NE2d 1255, 1259 (Ind App 2011) (noting 
that the “severity of the charges against [the defendant] sufficiently counterbalances her 
ties in the community and history of appearing in court”). See also Garcia v Wasylyshyn, 
2007 WL 2216971, *2 (Ohio App) (“The nature and number of counts, as well as the pos-
sible sentences if convicted, support the implication that petitioner may indeed be a 
flight risk.”). 
 145 See 18 USC § 3142(e)(2)–(3), (f)(1). Many states have similar rebuttable pre-
sumptions against release. See, for example, Alaska Stat § 12.30.011(d)(2); NC Gen Stat 
§ 15A-533(d), (e). 
 146 See Statement of Interest of the United States, Varden v City of Clanton, Civil 
Action No 15-34, *9 (MD Ala filed Feb 13, 2015) (“Varden Statement of Interest”) 
(“Fixed-sum bail systems . . . [set money bail] based solely on the criminal charge.”); 
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Assuming that offense seriousness correlates to flight risk 
has intuitive appeal, but decades of bail studies challenge that 
claim.147 As noted earlier, defendants charged with more serious 
offenses like murder or rape do not, in fact, fail to appear at 
higher rates than those with lesser charges.148 
These studies conclude that other factors, such as employ-
ment, family ties, community reputation, and prior record of ap-
pearances, are better predictors of nonappearance.149 Although 
reformers have been successful in getting judges to pay atten-
tion to other factors over time,150 most judges still rely heavily on 
the charge.151 
In some cases, judges have also described a second link be-
tween FTA and the seriousness of the charged offense. Some 
judges, in addition to viewing offense seriousness as predictive 
of flight, believe that the seriousness of the offense represents 
the costs of an FTA.152 In other words, for more serious crimes, 
 
Subramanian, et al, Incarceration’s Front Door at *32 (cited in note 4) (“[Bail schedules] 
link bail amounts to the severity of the initial charge, with criminal charge serving as a 
proxy for risk of re-arrest and flight, and the bail amount meant to mitigate that risk.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 147 See, for example, Jennifer Fratello, Annie Salsich, and Sara Mogulescu, Juvenile 
Detention Reform in New York City: Measuring Risk through Research *9 (Vera Institute 
of Justice, Apr 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/SV2T-CKKP (“Neither charge type nor 
charge severity . . . were found to be associated with failure to appear or rearrest [of ju-
venile defendants], even though these factors are often included in normatively based 
detention risk assessments.”); Kelly Dedel and Garth Davies, Validating Multnomah 
County’s Juvenile Detention Risk Assessment Instrument *8 (Multnomah County 
Department of Community Justice, June 11, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/8JXR-
G2R4 (analyzing a risk-assessment instrument and identifying that offense seriousness 
was negatively correlated with pretrial FTA or rearrest); John S. Goldkamp and Michael 
R. Gottfredson, Policy Guidelines for Bail: An Experiment in Court Reform 70 (Temple 
1985) (“When failure rates are examined by the seriousness of the defendant’s charges, 
the relation assumed by the conventional wisdom is not found: failure rates do not in-
crease directly with seriousness levels.”). 
 148 See notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 149 See note 147. 
 150 See, for example, United States v Friedman, 837 F2d 48, 49 (2d Cir 1988) (“[T]he 
Bail Reform Act does not permit detention on the basis of dangerousness in the absence 
of risk of flight, obstruction of justice or an indictment for the [enumerated] offenses.”); 
id at 50 (requiring “more than evidence of the commission of a serious crime and the fact 
of a potentially long sentence to support a finding of risk of flight”). 
 151 See Goldkamp and Vîlcică, Judicial Discretion and the Unfinished Agenda of 
American Bail Reform at 125 (cited in note 15) (discussing evidence that “pretrial 
detention could even be assigned as outright punishment based on the charge 
standard”). 
 152 Id at 131–32 (explaining that some judges have been reluctant to give up on the 
“charge standard”—that is, setting bail according to “the seriousness of the lead charge 
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some judges are likely to impose higher bail or detain defend-
ants at higher rates because they perceive an increased “justice” 
cost to the community if a defendant who has committed a seri-
ous crime flees the jurisdiction, avoiding possible conviction and 
punishment.153 While this argument is compelling, it does not al-
ter the predictive value of offense seriousness. Instead, it 
suggests that for more serious offenses, judges will be more risk 
averse. 
b) Weight of the evidence.  As the argument goes, the 
stronger the prosecutor’s case against the defendant (that is, the 
weight of the evidence), the more likely it is that the defendant 
will be convicted, either because she will plead guilty in the face 
of a strong case or a jury will be more likely to find her guilty. 
The greater the chance of conviction, the greater the incentive to 
flee. Here, again, this increased incentive to flee is viewed as in-
creasing flight risk. As with offense seriousness, the perceived 
increased likelihood of guilt may also influence judges who will 
see the loss of the opportunity for justice as a factor if a guilty 
defendant flees.154 
Like the seriousness of the offense, the strength of the pros-
ecution’s case has a long historical pedigree155 and is embedded 
in many federal and state statutes.156 Judges denying bail also 
frequently discuss the weight of the evidence. Although this fac-
tor could be relevant to any risk of nonappearance, judges who 
discuss this factor in setting high bail amounts (or who deny bail 
on this ground) frequently describe their concerns in terms of 
“flight.”157 
 
in a defendant’s case”—because they view the seriousness of the charge as “a crude indi-
cation of the potential costs” of losing defendants to flight). 
 153 Id. Judges taking this view clearly presume the guilt of the arrestee. 
 154 See note 151. 
 155 See Kalhous and Meringolo, 32 Pace L Rev at 804 (cited in note 102) (tracing 
consideration of “the strength of the evidence” and “the likelihood of conviction” to at 
least the Statute of Westminster in 1275), citing Carbone, 34 Syracuse L Rev at 526–27 
(cited in note 102). These practices continued in colonial America. Throughout the colo-
nial period, both the seriousness of the charge and the weight of the evidence were 
viewed as “effective proxies for the risk of flight—where conviction appeared more likely, 
the presumption that the accused would flee was stronger.” Id at 806–07. 
 156 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(g)(2); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2937.222(C)(2). 
 157 Compare, for example, Bustamante-Conchas, 557 Fed Appx at 804 (affirming the 
decision to release the defendant when there was “substantial circumstantial evidence, 
but no direct evidence” that the defendant was guilty), with, for example, United States v 
Berkun, 392 Fed Appx 901, 903 (2d Cir 2010) (“Because the evidence of guilt is strong, it 
provides [the defendant] with an incentive to flee.”). 
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Scholars have long recognized the due process concerns that 
are implicated by setting conditions of release or denying release 
based on a pretrial assessment of the prosecution’s case.158 
Professor Shima Baradaran Baughman explains that the effects 
of pretrial detention, both on the likelihood of conviction and the 
severity of the sentence that will be imposed, can erode the pre-
sumption of innocence.159 
2. Ability to flee the jurisdiction. 
Many statutes include factors that seek to predict which de-
fendants are true flight risks. Ideally, judges would focus on 
those defendants who are likely to flee and not simply those who 
are able to flee.160 Because it is more difficult to ascertain or pre-
dict a defendant’s inclinations, however, judges making flight 
risk predictions often focus on a defendant’s ability to flee.161 The 
distinction is subtle. A defendant’s intent to flee might be in-
ferred from prior flight or a lack of cooperation with authorities, 
which are discussed below as reliability or trustworthiness fac-
tors.162 Judges may also look for evidence of preparation to leave 
the jurisdiction.163 Predicting a defendant’s ability to flee, how-
ever, generally involves analyzing her ties to other jurisdictions 
and her resources, both of which are discussed briefly below. 
 
 158 See Baradaran, 72 Ohio St L J at 771 (cited in note 24) (noting that a bail hear-
ing can become “a mini-trial before the actual trial (and significantly, without many of 
the protections that accompany a defendant at trial)”). 
 159 Id at 770–72. See also Stack, 342 US at 4: 
This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered 
preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment 
prior to conviction. . . . Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the 
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose 
its meaning. 
 160 See, for example, Bacon v United States, 449 F2d 933, 944 (9th Cir 1971) (finding 
that, although the government alleged that the defendant was able to flee, the govern-
ment failed to establish a likelihood of flight). 
 161 See, for example, United States v El-Hage, 213 F3d 74, 80 (2d Cir 2000) (making 
a flight determination because of the defendant’s “apparent access to false documents, 
his extensive history of travel and residence in other countries, and his alleged ties to an 
extensive and well-organized terrorist group whose leader and seven other of whose in-
dicted members are still at large”). 
 162 See, for example, Bacon, 449 F2d at 944 (finding no flight risk when “[t]here 
was no showing of past attempts . . . to evade judicial process, nor of past clandestine 
travels”). 
 163 See, for example, El-Hage, 213 F3d at 80 (highlighting the defendant’s “apparent 
access to false documents” as a reason for determining that he was a flight risk). 
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In a 1978 decision granting bail pending appeal to Truong 
Dinh Hung (who was already convicted of espionage), Justice 
William Brennan emphasized this difference between ability to 
flee and intention to flee.164 The district court revoked Truong’s 
bail after his conviction based on his Vietnamese citizenship and 
family ties, his contacts with the Vietnamese ambassador in 
Paris (with whom he had exchanged classified information), and 
his lack of permanent residence in the United States.165 The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed.166 Writing as the circuit justice for the 
Fourth Circuit, Brennan reversed, citing Truong’s domestic ties 
and numerous character references. He explained that even if 
the considerations cited by the lower courts “suggest opportuni-
ties for flight, they hardly establish any inclination on the part 
of applicant to flee.”167 As we work to develop and refine our 
flight risk predictions, we should evaluate how well a defend-
ant’s ability to flee meaningfully predicts his intention to flee. 
a) Ties outside the jurisdiction.  Defendants with signifi-
cant ties outside the jurisdiction are traditionally viewed as 
more likely, or at least more able, to flee.168 Courts evaluating 
ties to another jurisdiction consider: (i) both family and financial 
 
 164 See Truong Dinh Hung v United States, 439 US 1326, 1328–29 (1978) (“Truong II”). 
 165 See id at 1326–27. 
 166 United States v Truong Dinh Hung, 577 F2d 738 (4th Cir 1978) (table) (“Truong I”). 
 167 Truong II, 439 US at 1329. Truong appeared as required and his case became 
known for establishing the “primary purpose” standard that was eventually incorporated 
into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. See United States v Truong Dinh Hung, 
629 F2d 908, 915 (4th Cir 1980) (“Truong III”) (holding that warrantless surveillance 
that was “conducted primarily for foreign intelligence reasons” did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment) (quotation marks omitted). 
 168 These issues arise most often for defendants with significant overseas ties. See 
Kalhous and Meringolo, 32 Pace L Rev at 829 (cited in note 101) (“Another very common 
reason [for a defendant to be denied bail] is the country of origin of a defendant—
whether he is a citizen or not. A naturalized citizen with contacts abroad is viewed with 
skepticism.”). Relatedly, as outlined in the next Section, defendants with domestic con-
nections and anchors are viewed as a lower risk of flight. 
2018] Defining Flight Risk 709 
 
connections;169 (ii) a defendant’s travel history;170 and (iii) the ju-
risdiction’s extradition practices.171 
This factor, of course, is entirely flight focused. Foreign ties 
may be predictive of whether a defendant remains in the juris-
diction or flees, but for defendants who remain in the jurisdic-
tion, foreign ties are irrelevant to the likelihood that the defend-
ants will appear for court, except to the extent that they may 
correlate with language or cultural barriers to information about 
court processes or schedules. 
b) Resources.  Courts frequently analyze a defendant’s re-
sources in evaluating flight risk.172 In short, courts view wealthi-
er defendants as more able to flee the jurisdiction and to sustain 
their flight. 
In a number of controversial, high-profile cases, courts have 
ordered wealthy defendants to be confined in their homes prior 
to trial (as opposed to ordering them to be detained in jail facili-
ties) on the condition that these defendants (or their families) 
pay for twenty-four-hour private security.173 In a 2016 news arti-
cle describing these self-funded “gilded cage” arrangements, 
Judge Jed Rakoff (who nevertheless ordered a defendant’s re-
lease on these conditions) was described as having “acknowl-
edged concerns that such an arrangement . . . gave people of 
 
 169 See, for example, United States v Villapudua-Quintero, 308 Fed Appx 272, 273 
(10th Cir 2009) (affirming magistrate judge’s conclusion that family ties to Mexico ren-
dered the defendant a flight risk); United States v Kattar, 1992 WL 80317, *4–5 (1st Cir) 
(considering factors like the defendant’s Lebanese passport, real property, and bank ac-
counts when deciding whether to grant petition for release). 
 170 See, for example, Bustamante-Conchas, 557 Fed Appx at 805 (considering de-
fendant’s frequent and recent visits to Mexico); United States v Bonilla, 388 Fed Appx 
78, 80 (2d Cir 2010) (considering defendant’s frequent trips to the Dominican Republic in 
recent years); United States v Khanu, 370 Fed Appx 121, 121–22 (DC Cir 2010) (consid-
ering defendant’s citizenship and pre-indictment trip to Sierra Leone). 
 171 See, for example, Kalhous and Meringolo, 32 Pace L Rev at 829–33 (cited in note 
102) (“[T]he government has advanced the proposition that individual defendants with 
ties to Israel present an additional risk of flight given Israel’s Law of Return.”). 
 172 See, for example, United States v Valdivia, 104 Fed Appx 753, 754–55 (1st Cir 
2004) (relying on the defendant’s “resources and foreign contacts” and “established ties 
outside the United States” to conclude that he posed a flight risk); United States v 
Aitken, 898 F2d 104, 107 (9th Cir 1990) (concluding that defendant was a flight risk in 
part because he had “access to large sums of cash”). See also Craven, 1998 WL 196622 at 
*2 (discussing legislative history pertaining to flight risk and drug trafficking). 
 173 See, for example, United States v Madoff, 586 F Supp 2d 240, 243–44 (SDNY 
2009); United States v Sabhnani, 493 F3d 63, 80 (2d Cir 2007) (“The defendants shall 
pay all costs associated with electronic monitoring.”). 
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means ‘an opportunity for release that poorer people could never 
obtain.’”174 
The vast majority of defendants, whose resources fall far 
short of those of the defendants just described, are on the other 
end of the spectrum. While these defendants may pose risks of 
nonappearance,175 their socioeconomic status makes it unlike-
ly that they could flee from the jurisdiction. Successful flight 
from the jurisdiction suggests access to networks and re-
sources that are not part of the equation for the vast majority 
of nonappearing defendants. 
A federal district-court judge in Detroit recently summarized 
this distinction succinctly. In rejecting the Government’s asser-
tion that the defendant was a flight risk, the judge explained: 
The Court disagrees. Defendant has lived in the community 
his entire life, was employed for over a year and living with 
his girlfriend and their infant daughter until his arrest. . . . 
Contrary to the government’s view, defendant is not a risk 
of flight. Offenders like defendant almost never flee; they 
have nowhere to go.176 
3. Anchors to the jurisdiction. 
Federal and state statutes also include a series of factors 
that function as anchors to the jurisdiction, reducing the risk 
that a defendant will flee the jurisdiction. These include a de-
fendant’s family responsibilities, community ties, employment or 
educational commitments, citizenship, and length of residen-
cy.177 While these factors have traditionally been discussed by 
 
 174 Benjamin Weiser, Rich Defendants’ Request to Judges: Lock Me Up in a Gilded 
Cage (NY Times, June 1, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/06/02/nyregion/rich-defendants-request-to-judges-lock-me-up-in-a-gilded-cage.html 
(visited Nov 9, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable), quoting United States v Dreier, 596 F 
Supp 2d 831, 833 (SDNY 2009). 
 175 See Part IV.B.1. 
 176 Amended Memorandum: Reasons for Pretrial Release, United States v Smith, 
Criminal Action No 15-20053, *2 (ED Mich filed May 4, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 
2015 WL 2084720). 
 177 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(g)(3) (listing among factors to be considered in 
determining conditions of release: “the history and characteristics of the person, includ-
ing . . . family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the communi-
ty, community ties . . .”); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2937.222(C)(3)(a) (“[Factors include] fami-
ly ties, employment, . . . length of residence in the community, community ties [and 
others].”). 
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both federal and state courts in terms of flight,178 they are also 
relevant to predicting and managing the categories of local non-
appearances that are included in the taxonomy. 
Connections to the jurisdiction operate in two ways. First, 
courts view them as anchors to the jurisdiction, creating incen-
tives for released defendants to stay. Second, they make defend-
ants remaining in the jurisdiction easier to locate, either before 
(for reminders) or after a scheduled appearance.179 
4. Reliability and trustworthiness. 
The final set of statutory factors reflects a court’s assess-
ment of the defendant’s reliability or trustworthiness to show up 
for court. These factors are relevant to all of the categories of 
nonappearance proposed in Part IV. 
a) Prior record (defaults, nonappearances, or cooperation).  
Most federal and state statutes direct courts to consider evi-
dence of a defendant’s past “record concerning appearance at 
court proceedings” when weighing pretrial risks.180 Nearly sev-
enty years ago in Stack, Justice Robert Jackson described this 
information as relevant to a defendant’s “trustworthiness to ap-
pear for trial.”181 As Jackson explained, this evaluation should 
include positive and negative evidence: “Each accused is entitled 
to any benefits due to his good record, and misdeeds or a bad 
record should prejudice only those who are guilty of them.”182 In 
appropriate cases, courts have also considered a related meas-
ure: a defendant’s prior cooperation with authorities.183 
 
 178 Compare, for example, Valdivia, 104 Fed Appx at 754 (finding that the defend-
ant’s strong family and community ties did not overcome the presumption in favor of de-
tention), and Hernandez, 669 SE2d at 435 (upholding high bail amount in light of the 
fact that the defendant did not own a home in the state, among other factors), with, for 
example, United States v Xulam, 84 F3d 441, 442 (DC Cir 1996) (overturning denial of 
bail for a defendant who had strong community ties and posed no threat to the communi-
ty), and State v Brown, 338 P3d 1276, 1291–92 (NM 2014) (overturning high bail amount 
when the defendant had employment as well as family and community ties). 
 179 See Part IV.B.1 (discussing low-cost nonappearances). 
 180 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A). See also, for example, DC Code § 23-1322(e)(3)(A) (using 
the same language as the federal statute). 
 181 Stack, 342 US at 9 (Jackson concurring). Some statutes include factors that per-
mit a more general inquiry into trustworthiness. See, for example, NY Crim Proc Law 
§ 510.30(2)(a)(i) (“The principal’s character, reputation, habits, and mental condition . . . 
[are factors in] the issuance of . . . bail.”). 
 182 Stack, 342 US at 9 (Jackson concurring). 
 183 See, for example, United States v Clum, 492 Fed Appx 81, 85 (11th Cir 2012) 
(noting the defendant’s prior refusal to cooperate). See also Lauryn P. Gouldin, When 
Deference Is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in Material-Witness Detentions, 49 Am Crim L 
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Federal and state courts applying this factor describe it as 
predictive of “flight”184 and “nonappearance risk.”185 Particularly 
when defendants have multiple FTAs, courts and risk-
assessment tools give this factor substantial weight.186 
b) Substance abuse.  In some cases, judges have also 
used a defendant’s drug or alcohol abuse, another statutory 
factor, as evidence that the defendant is a greater risk of non-
appearance.187 Occasionally, courts note the lack of such prob-
lems as reducing the risk of nonappearance.188 
* * * 
Analyzed collectively, the statutory factors that guide judg-
es’ discretion pose several problems. First, as noted above, fur-
ther work must be done to confirm the factors’ predictive utility. 
Second, the statutes themselves provide little direction to judges 
about which factors are relevant to which pretrial risks and how 
to weigh the presence of multiple factors. As a result, judges 
have broad discretion, which they use to overmanage pretrial 
 
Rev 1333, 1349–50 (2012) (analyzing relevance of prior cooperation to flight-risk analysis 
in material-witness cases). 
 184 See, for example, Berkun, 392 Fed Appx at 903 (upholding detention because the 
defendant committed the alleged crime while on bail for a different crime, revealing a 
“record of deceiving the court”); United States v Kisling, 334 F3d 734, 735 (8th Cir 2003) 
(upholding the denial of bail when defendant’s history of avoiding his legal troubles, in-
cluding evading service and an FTA, made him a flight risk). See also, for example, 
Querubin v Commonwealth, 795 NE2d 534, 544 (Mass 2003) (holding that defendant was 
a flight risk because he was known to use an alias, originally eluded several police offic-
ers when they attempted to arrest him on several default warrants, and as a result 
failed to appear before the court on a cocaine trafficking charge); People v Gurule, 174 
P3d 846, 846 (Colo App 2007) (upholding the denial of an appeal bond because the court 
determined that the defendant posed a flight risk due to his FTA for a sentencing pro-
ceeding and return only several months later). 
 185 See, for example, Clum, 492 Fed Appx at 85 (upholding the district court’s denial 
of bail when the defendant resisted arrest, refused to cooperate, and had a history of de-
fying the authority of the courts, including one FTA). 
 186 See notes 214–28 and accompanying text (discussing the Arnold Foundation’s 
risk-assessment tool). See also, for example, United States v Rico, 551 Fed Appx 446, 447 
(10th Cir 2014) (finding the defendant’s two recent FTAs relevant to nonappearance risk 
analysis); State v Dunn, 2014 WL 3714647, *5 (Vt) (upholding the defendant’s substan-
tial monetary bail due to two previous FTAs, two probation violations, and an out-of-
state address). 
 187 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A). See also, for example, Fla Rules Crim Proc § 3.131(b)(3); 
Rico, 551 Fed Appx at 447 (finding the defendant to be a flight risk due in part to his 
history of drug and alcohol abuse). 
 188 See, for example, Bustamante-Conchas, 557 Fed Appx at 804 (favoring release 
when, among other factors, the defendant lacked a history of drug or alcohol abuse); 
Brown, 338 P3d at 1291 (same). 
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risks.189 For these reasons, jurisdictions across the country have 
been anxious to modernize and refine the process of pretrial risk 
prediction. The products of those efforts are the focus of Part III. 
III.  PREDICTING NONAPPEARANCE: MODERN RISK-ASSESSMENT 
TOOLS 
Risk-assessment tools that employ “rigorous, scientific, 
data-driven” analyses promise a move away from unbridled ju-
dicial discretion and from problematic judicial reliance on “gut 
and intuition.”190 But these tools have serious issues relating to 
the calculation of nonappearance risk.191 
First, as I have argued previously, many tools merge non-
appearance and public-safety risks into one “pretrial failure” 
risk measurement despite constitutional, statutory, and policy 
arguments for measuring those risks separately.192 Second, as 
detailed here and in Part IV.B, the tools predict nonappearance 
risk in only its broadest form. Thus, these tools ignore both long-
standing doctrinal and statutory emphasis on concerns about 
flight risk and clear, practical policy needs for a more nuanced 
understanding of the problems of nonappearance. Finally, these 
risk-assessment tools measure only this very broadly defined 
nonappearance risk in the absence of any court intervention. 
Judges, however, need guidance and feedback about how to 
manage flight risk using existing tools.193 Most statutes can be 
interpreted as requiring this sort of inquiry. A static 
 
 189 See Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 426–28 (cited in note 15) (discussing how 
judicial discretion creates agency costs). 
 190 Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment at *5 (cited in note 17). 
To be clear, risk assessment is not new. The statutory risk factors outlined in Part II.C 
were designed to help judges assess risk. Those factors derived from risk-assessment 
tools developed by the Vera Institute of Justice in the 1960s. Risk-assessment tools, 
however, have evolved considerably over time. For a detailed summary of the history of 
these tools and of their use in a range of criminal justice contexts, see Melissa Hamilton, 
Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 Am Crim L Rev 231, 
236–39 (2015); id at 233 (explaining that these tools are seeing their “heyday in criminal 
justice”). See also Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal 
History on Risk Assessments, 20 Berkeley J Crim L 75, 91–95 (providing a general sum-
mary of how these tools work). 
 191 As noted in Part III.C, these tools have prompted a range of other thoughtful and 
well-developed critiques, many of which are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 192 Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 892 (cited in note 16). 
 193 See Subramanian, et al, Incarceration’s Front Door at *31 (cited in note 4) (“[T]he 
best [risk-assessment] tools evaluate the person’s dynamic or changeable risk factors and 
needs, [so] they should be re-administered routinely to determine whether current su-
pervision or custody levels and programming are still appropriate.”). 
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nonappearance calculation that does not incorporate various 
conditions of release, then, is of limited utility. 
In the following sections, this Article (i) briefly reviews the 
connection between risk assessment and broader bail reform ef-
forts; (ii) examines how the tools define risks of nonappearance 
and validate outcomes; and (iii) evaluates why the tools have 
been inattentive to distinctions between flight and other forms 
of nonappearance. 
A. Bail Reform, Generally 
In a 2013 report describing the impetus for its efforts to de-
velop a national pretrial risk-assessment tool, the Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation explained that, in jurisdictions that do 
not rely on risk assessment, “too many high-risk defendants go 
free, and too many low-risk defendants remain locked up for 
long periods.”194 In June 2016, the Obama administration an-
nounced the Data-Driven Justice Initiative—with increased use 
of these tools as one of its key strategies—reflecting a growing 
consensus that risk-assessment tools should more effectively 
identify low-risk defendants who should be released before tri-
al.195 As the tools become more economical, more jurisdictions 
are adopting them.196 
The rise of risk assessment has occurred alongside another 
pretrial reform agenda: the effort to end reliance on money bail 
as a means of managing pretrial risk. For decades, and despite 
legislative reforms, judges have transformed bail from a condi-
tion of release to a predicate for detention. 
Reformers have focused on eliminating money bail or, alter-
natively, radically changing how bail amounts are set. New 
Jersey and New Mexico have enacted comprehensive constitu-
tional and legislative changes, shifting away from money bail.197 
 
 194 See Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment at *5 (cited in note 
17) (“These systemic failures put the public in danger and place unnecessary strain on 
budgets, jails, law enforcement, families, and communities.”). 
 195 FACT SHEET: Launching the Data-Driven Justice Initiative (cited in note 1). 
 196 Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail (NY Times, 
June 26, 2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of 
-bail-into-a-science.html (visited Nov 9, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). In 2015, few-
er than 10 percent of jurisdictions were employing these types of tools, but that number 
has been increasing. Id. 
 197 Equal Justice Initiative, Delaware Access to Justice Commission’s Committee on 
Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: A Report on Bail and Pretrial Detention *9 (Oct 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2VC7-R7EU (“In 2014, New Jersey passed two pieces 
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Connecticut passed legislation in June 2017 that significantly 
limits the use of money bail in misdemeanor cases,198 and, at the 
time of this writing, Governor Andrew Cuomo is advocating for 
comparable changes in New York.199 In February 2017, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals approved changes to the Maryland 
Rules of Procedure intended to reduce (but not eliminate) reli-
ance on money bail by requiring judges to consider defendants’ 
ability to pay before setting bail.200 Class-action plaintiffs have, 
with support from the Obama administration’s Department of 
Justice, forced reforms in jurisdictions across the country by 
bringing successful challenges to existing money-bail systems.201 
Reformers have also sought to change who pays bail, advocating 
 
of bail/pretrial detainment reform legislation concurrently . . . [to] shift[ ] New Jersey’s 
pretrial release system from a money-based bail system to a primarily risk-based sys-
tem.”). See Chapter 31, 2014 NJ Sess Law 467, codified at NJ Stat Ann § 2A:162-15 to 
-26; NJ Const Art I, ¶ 11, amended by 2014 NJ Sess Law 865. See also Lisa W. Foderaro, 
New Jersey Alters Its Bail System and Upends Legal Landscape (NY Times, Feb 6, 2017), 
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-system.html (vis-
ited Nov 9, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (explaining that these changes, which 
went into effect in January 2017, “placed the state in the forefront of a national move-
ment aimed at changing [the] bail system”). New Mexico voters recently amended their 
constitution. See NM Const Art II, § 13 (declaring that no defendant eligible for pretrial 
release shall “be detained solely because of financial inability to post a money or proper-
ty bond”); Susan Montoya Bryan, Voters: Judges Can Deny Bail to Dangerous Defendants 
(Santa Fe New Mexican, Nov 8, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6SF6-LU2Z. 
 198 See Press Release, Gov. Malloy Signs Legislation Reforming the State’s Pretrial 
Justice System to Help Break the Cycle of Crime and Poverty (Office of Governor Dannel 
P. Malloy, June 28, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2SWC-LY26; An Act concerning 
Pretrial Justice Reform, Public Act 17-145, codified at Conn Gen Stat § 54-64a(a) et seq. 
 199 See Steve Hughes, Cuomo’s Bail Reform Effort Spurs Debate (Times Union, Feb 
11, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/7RZ9-UVBK (“New York appears increasingly like-
ly to join several other states that have enacted bail reforms.”); Andrew M. Cuomo, New 
York State: Excelsior Ever Upward, 2018 State of the State *59–60 (2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/HLG3-B4WG. 
 200 Md Rule 4-216.1(b)(2) (calling for “individualized consideration” of a defendant’s 
“ability . . . to meet a special condition of release with financial terms”). Additional legis-
lative reforms may follow. See Michael Dresser, Maryland Court of Appeals: Defendants 
Can’t Be Held in Jail Because They Can’t Afford Bail (Baltimore Sun, Feb 8, 2017), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/PBX6-A4Y3. 
 201 See, for example, Varden Statement of Interest at *1 (cited in note 146) (associ-
ated with a case in which Ms. Varden, an indigent defendant, was jailed after the 
Clanton Municipal Court used a generic bail schedule to impose bail in the amount of 
$2,000, which she could not afford to pay). The Department of Justice filed a statement 
of interest in the case asserting: “Incarcerating individuals solely because of their inabil-
ity to pay for their release, whether through the payment of fines, fees, or a cash bond, 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. This statement 
of interest has since been cited in bail challenges across the country. See, for example, 
Thompson v Moss Point, 2015 WL 10322003, *1 (SD Miss). 
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for the end of commercial bail202 and promoting the use of com-
munity bail funds.203 
The significant investment of time, resources, and political 
capital in both of these efforts—increasing the use of risk-
assessment tools and reducing reliance on money bail—has been 
cause for optimism that what is being described as a “third gen-
eration,” or “third wave,” of bail reform might achieve meaning-
ful change.204 In most places, these reform efforts are paired, 
with money bail schemes giving way to risk assessment. 
B. Defining and Describing Risks of Nonappearance 
Although the tools being used in jurisdictions across the 
country vary from each other in interesting ways, they have a 
few important common features. In addition to gauging a par-
ticular defendant’s “danger to the community,” each tool en-
deavors “to identify the likelihood of failure to appear in 
court.”205 No tool mentions or measures “flight risk.”206 
 
 202 Commercial bail bondsmen or commercial sureties provide bail to defendants for 
a price and have, over time, become a fixture in American criminal justice. Their lobby-
ists frequently challenge bail reform efforts. Many groups advocate for abolition of these 
for-profit bail enterprises. See Justice Policy Institute, Finding Direction: Expanding 
Criminal Justice Options by Considering Policies of Other Nations *1–3 (Apr 2011), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/YMF5-7PSU (observing that other countries like Australia, 
Canada, Finland, Germany, and England do not permit commercial bail). 
 203 In 2015, a New York City council member recommended that the city allocate 
$1.4 million of community funds to pay “bail set at $2,000 or lower for defendants 
charged with low-level misdemeanors and unable to afford it.” Emily Ngo, NYC Council 
Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito Proposes Bail Fund for Indigent Defendants (Newsday, 
June 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3BC3-7DPL. See also Jocelyn Simonson, Bail 
Nullification, 115 Mich L Rev 585, 599–606 (2017) (describing the growing phenomenon 
of community bail funds in detail). 
 204 See note 14. 
 205 Marie VanNostrand and Kenneth J. Rose, Pretrial Risk Assessment in Virginia 
*3 (Luminosity, May 1, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/63S7-WNTQ. As I have ex-
plained in other work, in the pretrial context, there are constitutional and statutory re-
quirements that call for separate measurements of flight (or nonappearance) risk and 
danger. Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 871–81 (cited in note 16). There are also compelling 
policy reasons for disentangling those risks. Id at 885–93. 
 206 It is worth clarifying that “flight risk” as contemplated in this Article is not the 
same as a very high risk of nonappearance. For the reasons outlined in Part IV.A, flight 
risk should be treated as a different type of risk than other forms of nonappearance (not 
merely as a different degree of the same risk). 
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1. Risk factors. 
The tools use between seven and fifteen factors,207 but most 
tools include the factors found in the federal variant: 
(1) “charges pending against the defendant at the time of 
arrest” 
(2) “number of prior misdemeanor arrests” 
(3) “number of prior felony arrests” 
(4) “number of prior failures to appear” 
(5) “whether the defendant was employed at the time of the 
arrest” 
(6) “defendant’s residency status” 
(7) “whether the defendant suffered from substance abuse 
problems” 
(8) “nature of the primary charge” 
(9) “whether the primary charge was a misdemeanor or a 
felony”208 
Other tools incorporate additional risk factors, including any 
prior violent convictions, whether the defendant was previously 
incarcerated, whether a defendant has a working phone, and 
demographic indicators like the defendant’s age, mental health, 
marital status, citizenship, and education.209 
While some risk factors overlap with the statutory factors 
discussed in Part II.C, there is one important difference. Legis-
lators incorporating risk factors into bail statutes attempted to 
identify factors with a causal relationship to nonappearance—
either factors that provided incentives to flee or factors anchor-
ing defendants to the jurisdiction. Risk-assessment tools, how-
ever, generally do not endeavor to identify what causes non-
appearance (or recidivism). Instead they seek to identify “what 
other [correlative] factors tend to be present” when 
nonappearance (or recidivism) occurs.210 
 
 207 See Mayson, 127 Yale L J at 510–15 (cited in note 14) (comparing current pre-
trial risk-assessment tools). 
 208 Marie VanNostrand and Gena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Court *5 (Luminosity, Apr 14, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/8NHF-R63S. 
 209 See Mayson, 127 Yale L J at 512 (cited in note 14). 
 210 Jessica Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 Emory L J 59, 79 (2017) (ex-
plaining that for the recidivism-predicting tools used in the sentencing context, tool de-
velopers identified predictive factors with a “statistically significant correlation” with 
recidivism). 
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Studies suggest that the most commonly used tools have 
similar “predictive validity.”211 The factors that most current 
tools use also “resemble” those highlighted in earlier genera-
tions’ risk-prediction studies.212 Many of the same factors appear 
in federal and state statutes.213 
Risk-assessment tools give a defendant a risk score based on 
the defendant’s risk-factor scores (which are weighted different-
ly according to their predictive value) and assign the defendant 
to a particular risk category. Most tools do not specify which fac-
tors predict nonappearance. The Public Safety Assessment 
(PSA) tool (discussed in the next Section) is an exception to that 
rule. 
2. Shifting away from interviews. 
By 2015, less than 10 percent of jurisdictions used actuarial 
risk-assessment tools, but that number is rising.214 The cost of 
administering some tools is a barrier to widespread adoption 
and, as a result, developing less expensive tools is a priority for 
those who see risk assessment as the key to bail reform.215 The 
PSA tool developed by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation 
was designed to respond to those cost concerns.216 The PSA does 
not rely on an interview with a defendant, which makes it much 
less expensive for jurisdictions to administer (and thus to 
adopt).217 The PSA also shifts entirely to static risk factors (that 
is, fixed attributes) and away from dynamic risk factors (that 
can change and can be the focus of judicial intervention).218 
The PSA improves on other tools in several ways. First, it 
separately predicts nonappearance and future criminal activity, 
 
 211 Nathan James, Risk and Needs Assessment in the Criminal Justice System *3 
(Congressional Research Service, June 22, 2015). 
 212 Vîlcică and Goldkamp, 42 Crim Just & Behav at 1162 (cited in note 81) (review-
ing studies of current risk-assessment tools). 
 213 See notes 132–36 and accompanying text. 
 214 See Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail (cited in note 196). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Public Safety Assessment (cited in note 22) (noting that the PSA is “far less ex-
pensive . . . than previous techniques”). See also Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture 
with Formula for Bail (cited in note 196) (explaining that part of the appeal is that the 
PSA is “designed to be more economical than existing risk assessments”). 
 217 Public Safety Assessment (cited in note 22). 
 218 Mayson, 127 Yale L J at 511–12 (cited in note 14) (outlining the risk factors used 
in all pretrial tools currently in use). Risk factors that are “static” include, for instance, 
having a prior conviction and a history of FTAs, while “dynamic” factors include em-
ployment status and substance abuse. Id at 512. 
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avoiding a problem that plagues other tools.219 Second, it pre-
dicts future violence separately (“new violent criminal activi-
ty”) from the much broader category of “new criminal activi-
ty.”220 Third, the foundation is more transparent than some 
proprietary vendors about how its tool operates.221 Finally, the 
PSA is free for jurisdictions to obtain (and as noted above, it is 
less expensive to administer).222 As of June 2015, the PSA was 
being used in thirty-eight US jurisdictions, including three 
states: Arizona, Kentucky, and New Jersey.223 
Because it does not rely on a defendant interview, the PSA 
does not include many of the traditional statutory factors that 
have been incorporated into other risk-assessment tools, includ-
ing factors like family and community ties, employment, and 
residency status.224 Instead, the PSA analyzes factors that can 
be ascertained from the defendant’s record, including: 
(1) the defendant’s age 
(2) whether the current offense is violent 
(3) whether the person has a pending charge at the time of 
arrest 
(4) whether the person has a prior misdemeanor conviction 
(5) whether the person has a prior felony conviction 
(6) whether the person has a prior conviction for a violent 
crime 
(7) whether the person failed to appear at a pretrial hearing 
in the last two years 
(8) whether the person failed to appear at a pretrial hearing 
more than two years ago 
(9) whether the person has previously been sentenced to 
incarceration225 
 
 219 Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and 
Formula *2, archived at http://perma.cc/3GHR-GT8P. The problems with combining fu-
ture dangerousness and flight risk into a single risk measure are discussed in an earlier 
article. See Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 885–89 (cited in note 16). 
 220 Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula at *2 (cited in note 219). 
 221 See Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 118–19 (cited in note 210) (arguing for greater 
transparency regarding risk-assessment tool inputs and outcomes to “facilitate public 
accountability”). 
 222 Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula at *4 (cited in note 219). 
 223 Public Safety Assessment (cited in note 22). See also text accompanying note 215. 
 224 Statutory factors are detailed in Part II.C. Risk factors used in other risk-
assessment tools are outlined in Part III.B.1. See also Public Safety Assessment: Risk 
Factors and Formula at *2 (cited in note 219) (listing the risk factors used by PSA). 
 225 Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula at *2 (cited in note 219). 
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Four of these factors are used to predict a defendant’s non-
appearance risk:226 
(1) a pending charge (misdemeanor or felony) earns a de-
fendant one point 
(2) a prior misdemeanor or felony conviction earns a de-
fendant one point 
(3) a prior FTA that is more than two years old earns a de-
fendant one point 
(4) an FTA within the last two years earns two points; for 
two or more FTAs in the last two years, the defendant 
earns four points 
These points are tallied to determine where the defendant will 
be placed on the PSA’s six-point FTA scale. The scale ranges 
from one, the lowest risk level, to six, the highest. As the foun-
dation has explained, “the likelihood of a negative pretrial out-
come increases with each successive point on the scale.”227 
Unfortunately, the PSA predicts future nonappearance in on-
ly its broadest form. There is no discussion (or prediction) of flight 
risk and no distinction made between types of nonappearance.228 
All the risk-assessment tools currently being used rely heav-
ily on prior FTAs to generate predictions of future 
nonappearance.229 In general, a defendant’s FTA at a court ap-
pearance—even if it does not involve willful nonappearance or 
flight from the jurisdiction—will give the defendant a recorded 
FTA.230 Of all the factors, this will significantly elevate the de-
fendant’s risk of a future FTA, particularly if the prior FTA is 
more recent.231 The validation of the tools also overemphasizes 
 
 226 Id at *3. 
 227 Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment at *4 (cited in note 17). 
 228 See Public Safety Assessment (cited in note 22). 
 229 See, for example, Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula at *2–3 
(cited in note 219) (noting that a prior FTA in the past two years is worth twice as much 
weight as other factors, such as prior convictions, in calculating a defendant’s risk of 
FTA for future court dates). Reliance on prior FTAs to predict a future FTA is based 
on studies indicating the strength of nonappearance history in predicting future 
nonappearance. See Cohen and Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State 
Courts at *9–10 (cited in note 45) (showing that defendants with a prior FTA were more 
likely to fail to appear than defendants with no arrest record and than those with an ar-
rest record but no previous FTA). 
 230 See, for example, VanNostrand and Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the 
Federal Court at *3 (cited in note 208) (noting that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 identified 
the defendant’s “record of appearances at court proceedings” as one factor that courts 
should consider). 
 231 Id at *21. 
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nonappearance, broadly defined: in order for a defendant to be 
deemed a pretrial success, he must appear for all court dates.232 
As outlined in more detail in Part IV, merely evaluating broad 
nonappearance risk reinforces and exacerbates existing over-
detention problems. 
C. Explaining the Omission of Flight 
What explains the omission of true flight risk from pretrial 
risk-assessment tools? Why have the creators of the tools failed 
to distinguish between flight and local (nonflight) forms of non-
appearance, or between various types of local nonappearance?233 
Historical inattention to these distinctions, and the heritage 
of confused, inconsistent terminology may be part of the prob-
lem.234 Although some judges and some statutes have tried to 
draw meaningful distinctions, the general historical picture is 
one of a lack of attention to this pretrial detail. To be fair, con-
ceptions of nonappearance have become more nuanced as the 
number of pretrial court appearances and the overall delay in 
the pretrial process have increased over time. 
Reformers’ preoccupation with perfecting the definition and 
prediction of dangerousness may have led them to neglect flight 
and other forms of nonappearance risk.235 Pretrial risk assess-
ments have been adapted from tools used in other criminal jus-
tice contexts like corrections, in which the risks of a particular 
defendant’s future violence and recidivism are primary concerns, 
and nonappearance is not part of the risk calculus.236 
 
 232 Id at *20 (defining pretrial failure in part as “failing to appear for court”). 
 233 There is a growing literature analyzing the methodology of developing risk-
assessment tools and algorithms for the criminal justice system. See, for example, 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and the 
Future of Law Enforcement 136–40 (NYU 2017) (emphasizing the need for greater ac-
countability for tool developers and algorithm builders); Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 105 
(cited in note 210) (“[G]overnment entities and tool developers should adhere to various 
accountability measures in the construction of actuarial risk tools.”). See also generally 
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 164 U Pa L Rev 871 (2016) (focusing on use of machine-learning algorithms 
in the Fourth Amendment context). 
 234 See notes 26–30 and accompanying text (highlighting inconsistent usage of the 
terms “flight risk” and “nonappearance risk”). 
 235 See Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 420–21 (cited in note 15) (describing the 
focus in modern bail scholarship on predicting dangerousness and the neglect of flight 
risk). 
 236 See, for example, Edward Latessa, et al, Creation and Validation of the Ohio 
Risk Assessment System: Final Report *16 (July 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/7ZZ2 
-RHGS (explaining that one key distinction between Ohio’s Pretrial Assessment Tool and 
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Another explanation is that the tools may not be as objective 
and unbiased as they claim. The creators of these risk-
assessment tools (including some for-profit companies) are con-
cerned with reducing administrative costs so that the tools can 
be widely employed. As a result, they have an obvious appetite 
for and bias in favor of cheap data.237 Logging an FTA, in some 
jurisdictions, is the equivalent of taking attendance, and that bit 
of data is readily available. 
In addition, broadly defined risk categories are easier to 
predict, allowing creators to claim higher success rates. In other 
words, because the tools promise only to predict nonappearance 
broadly, they can claim greater success than if the tools purport-
ed to predict the narrower and more serious categories of risk 
(flight risks and local absconding risks) defined in the next 
Section. Certainly narrower categories are more difficult to ac-
curately predict, but the greater utility of those predictions 
would justify some increase in costs.238 
The problem with using readily available data, however, is 
that it may simply import existing problems into new contexts.239 
Even worse, it may create new problems by falsely inflating the 
seriousness of mere nonappearance. As the tools become ce-
mented in judicial decisionmaking and pretrial policymaking, 
these problems may become entrenched features. Scholars are 
increasingly recognizing the need for actuarial tools and for the 
 
similar tools used in other contexts (such as community supervision, prison intake, and 
reentry) is that the former requires prediction of the likelihood of a future FTA). See also 
Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 Notre Dame 
L Rev 537, 564–67 (2015) (documenting the embrace of risk-assessment instruments in 
the sentencing and corrections contexts). 
 237 See Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Cal L 
Rev 671, 691 (2016) (explaining that the disparate impact caused by certain tool features 
is the product of the creators’ “reasonable priorities as profit seekers”); Eaglin, 67 Emory 
L J at 66 (cited in note 210) (explaining that developers’ “desire for cheap, varied, and 
easily accessible data” influences the choices they make in constructing risk tools, some-
times in “conflict with a state’s existing sentencing policies and practices”); id at 80 (de-
scribing recidivism risk tool developers’ decision to use readily available arrest data as 
the measure of recidivism). 
 238 See Barocas and Selbst, 104 Cal L Rev at 688 (cited in note 237) (explaining that 
sometimes the data selected for study “fail[s] to capture enough detail to allow for the 
discovery of crucial points of contrast”). 
 239 See id at 674 (“Approached without care, data mining can reproduce existing 
patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision makers, or simply re-
flect the widespread biases that persist in society.”); Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 101–04 
(cited in note 210). 
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next generation of algorithms to incorporate, from the outset, 
accountability for “legal and policy objectives.”240 
Finally, as noted above, this flight-focused critique is nested 
within a broader literature that challenges the current use of 
risk-assessment tools.241 Scholars have raised important con-
cerns about the use of actuarial tools, or in some contexts more 
sophisticated machine-learning algorithms, to predict risk in the 
criminal justice system.242 The literature includes thorough en-
gagement with the basic underlying questions whether and 
when it is appropriate to rely on “statistically sound but non-
universal generalizations” to draw conclusions about the future 
behavior of members of particular groups.243 Others have focused 
on the due process and equal protection problems that risk-
assessment tools present.244 
 
 240 Joshua A. Kroll, et al, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U Pa L Rev 633, 640 (2017). 
See also id at 678 (highlighting the importance of assuring “fidelity to substantive policy 
choices”); Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing at 139 (cited in note 233) (“Accounta-
bility rather than transparency provides a way out of the black data opacity problem. 
Accountability by design will require big data policing to confront [problems of] bias, 
fear, and fair application.”); Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 105 (cited in note 210) (explaining 
that tool developers make decisions in constructing risk-assessment instruments that 
“implicate larger normative questions best left for criminal justice experts and the politi-
cal process to resolve”). 
 241 The risk typology proposed in Part IV is intended to improve pretrial 
decisionmaking, including but not limited to improving the accuracy and utility of risk-
assessment tool predictions. It does not directly address or cure the critiques briefly de-
scribed here. 
 242 Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 19 (Belknap 2003) 
(noting that “many people believe it wrong to make individual decisions on the basis of 
nonuniversal group characteristics even if the group attributions have a solid statistical 
grounding”). See also Christopher Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable: The Role of Law, 
Science, and Speculation in Adjudicating Culpability and Dangerousness 111–13 (Oxford 
2007) (defending actuarial predictions of violence risk); Bernard E. Harcourt, Against 
Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 237 (Chicago 2007) 
(arguing that actuarial methods not only “aggravate social disparities,” but might “back-
fire” and “increase rather than decrease the overall amount of crime in society”). 
 243 Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes at 19 (cited in note 242). 
 244 See, for example, Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out: Criminal Justice Risk 
Assessment and the Fantasy of Race Neutrality *32–33 (unpublished manuscript, 2017) 
(on file with author); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 Stan L Rev 803, 851 (2014) (critiquing existing 
evidence-based regimes and urging approaches that “base actuarial prediction only on 
crime characteristics and criminal history” and that strip “socioeconomic and demo-
graphic variables”); Hamilton, 52 Am Crim L Rev at 242 (cited in note 190) (analyzing 
evidence-based sentencing schemes and determining that the use of socioeconomic and 
demographic variables to contribute to a defendant’s sentence may violate the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses). 
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Even though proponents of the PSA (and other tools) claim 
to have avoided the selection of discriminatory factors,245 heavy 
reliance on prior nonappearance has a direct and clear impact 
on poorer defendants who may lack transportation or childcare 
or cannot miss employment.246 In addition, because these tools 
heavily weigh prior criminal records, they will disadvantage 
those who live in heavily policed communities and who will be 
picked up and prosecuted for misdemeanors that fly under the 
radar in more affluent neighborhoods.247 
IV.  A NEW TAXONOMY: DEFINING FLIGHT, DISTINGUISHING 
NONAPPEARANCE 
Before we can identify what risks we seek to predict and 
prevent, we must specify the categories of harms we seek to 
avoid. We still know far too little about who fails to appear, why 
they fail to appear, and what can be done to remedy that.248 This 
Article outlines what ought to be measured so that appropriate 
data can be gathered and employed to refine actuarial risk-
assessment tools, to improve judicial management of pretrial 
risks, and to highlight other bail reform priorities. 
It bears emphasizing here that the task for judges at the 
pretrial stage is one of risk management. Their objective is to 
ensure a defendant’s appearance at future court dates. They 
must calibrate risks of nonappearance and employ available 
conditions of release (or in extreme cases, deny release) to 
manage and mitigate those risks. Precision about risk defini-
tions, then, is required so that judges can make appropriate 
 
 245 See, for example, Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment at *5 
(cited in note 17). 
 246 See notes 270–73 and accompanying text. See also Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vand L Rev 1055, 1063–65 (2015) (describing chal-
lenges for poor defendants navigating the criminal justice system). 
 247 See Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 95 (cited in note 210) (“[M]ore frequent contact with 
the justice system does not necessarily mean higher risk to the public. Much of this con-
tact comes from heightened scrutiny, not necessarily more criminal wrongdoing.”). See 
also note 239 (explaining that, when used improperly, data may simply reproduce exist-
ing discrimination). 
 248 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 430–31 (cited in note 45) (describing the “elu-
siveness of complete and accurate data relating to fugitives” and explaining that “just 
the task of counting fugitives to define the numerators and denominators of potential 
effectiveness measures presents difficult challenges”). See also Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev 
at 337 (cited in note 69) (“[T]he studies are too few, too limited, and too dated to draw 
strong conclusions.”). 
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choices from a range of interventions that will manage the 
risks presented. 
The following sections propose a taxonomy of 
nonappearance before outlining research and reform priorities. 
First, the category of “true flight,” which includes defendants 
who leave the jurisdiction, is treated separately from “local” 
nonappearances. Within the remaining category of “local” non-
appearances, further distinctions are suggested to isolate a more 
serious and costly category of “local absconding” from what is 
termed “low-cost nonappearing.” 
A. True Flight 
The first subcategory of nonappearances—those defendants 
who flee the jurisdiction of arrest—is likely the narrowest of the 
subcategories. Because it is based simply on geographic move-
ments, this subcategory is also the easiest to define.249 This 
Section details why this group of defendants merits its own sub-
category (despite important similarities to the local absconders 
discussed below), the issues that presently exist with respect to 
collecting data about flight, and the best ways to remedy those 
data deficits to make useful and reliable flight predictions. 
There are several reasons why we must identify “true flight 
risks”—that is, those defendants who pose a high risk of leaving 
the jurisdiction—and isolate them from other individuals who 
pose risks of what will be termed “local nonappearances” in 
the sections that follow. As outlined above, treating all non-
appearances the same ignores the long-standing statutory and 
doctrinal focus on “flight risk.”250 
The judicial, legislative, and scholarly emphasis on flight 
risk is not a semantic quirk. It reflects awareness that flight 
from the jurisdiction imposes special costs. Although technology 
makes it increasingly easy to locate defendants who flee the ju-
risdiction, administrative headaches and financial realities often 
make it difficult to return defendants to the jurisdiction. Nota-
tions in the NCIC database indicate whether a state or local ju-
 
 249 Although data about who flees the jurisdiction are not presently collected and 
analyzed in the way envisioned by this paper, it may not be particularly difficult to begin 
to gather relevant statistics. At present, “fugitives are selected into the [US Marshals 
Service] in part based on the presumption of an offender having crossed state or national 
boundaries.” David M. Bierie and Paul J. Detar, Geographic and Social Movement of Sex 
Offender Fugitives, 62 Crime & Delinq 983, 997 (2016). 
 250 See Part II.B (statutes); Part II.C (cases). 
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risdiction is willing to pay for extradition and under what cir-
cumstances. Two factors, among others, determine the jurisdic-
tion’s willingness: the distance a defendant travels from the ju-
risdiction and the seriousness of the offense.251 Many 
jurisdictions stop trying to retrieve defendants who have fled the 
jurisdiction, particularly if they are not found in a border state 
or if they have been charged with a less serious offense.252 For 
defendants accused of lower-level offenses, it is plausible that 
the community may not view flight as particularly problematic 
and, as noted below, the community may elect to spend few re-
sources attempting to locate such defendants. Here again, 
judges should be encouraged to adjust their risk tolerance, as 
detaining low-level defendants to prevent flight is a poor allo-
cation of resources.253 
Tools should also measure flight risk apart from other non-
appearance risks because the possibility of flight suggests dif-
ferent judicial interventions. For example, judges may impose 
travel restrictions or confiscate travel documents from defend-
ants who pose flight risks. Judges faced with defendants who 
are flight risks may (particularly for defendants charged with 
more serious offenses) be able to justify using more aggressive 
forms of community supervision, GPS monitoring, house arrest, 
or, in extreme cases, detention. Given its high costs (both for the 
individuals being jailed and for the community), detention 
should be reserved for those who cannot be prevented or dis-
suaded from leaving the jurisdiction using less intrusive inter-
ventions.254 Judges use a range of tools to prevent released de-
fendants from fleeing the jurisdiction and to incentivize them to 
return to court, including imposing financial conditions, super-
 
 251 Brad Heath, The Ones That Get Away (USA Today, Mar 11, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/STF7-A77D (explaining that notations in the NCIC database indicate 
whether the jurisdiction of initial arrest is willing to pay to extradite the defendant). 
 252 See id. 
 253 See notes 174–76 and accompanying text. 
 254 The Bail Reform Act, for example, imposes obligations on judges to order release 
of defendants “subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of condi-
tions,” that would ensure their appearances. 18 USC § 3142(c)(1)(B). The appropriate-
ness of pretrial detention to manage public-safety risk (as opposed to nonappearance 
risk) is beyond the scope of this Article. See Baradaran and McIntyre, 90 Tex L Rev at 
526–29 (cited in note 24) (analyzing predictions of pretrial dangerousness). See also 
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 BU L Rev 1, 19 (2017) 
(comparing the costs associated with pretrial public-safety risk with the costs of pretrial 
detention). 
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vision conditions, travel restrictions, and, in some cases, the use 
of electronic monitoring.255 
Typically, in order to flee, defendants need resources.256 This 
category of true flight, then, will likely encompass wealthier de-
fendants than other nonappearing defendants (who remain in 
the jurisdiction). That resource divide may be useful both for 
predictive sorting purposes and for developing means of prevent-
ing flight. Although broad, indiscriminate use of money bail of-
ten leads to detention for indigent defendants, scholars should 
study and evaluate whether selectively applying financial condi-
tions can effectively discourage flight for released defendants 
who have resources.257 
Over time, technology and improved interjurisdictional co-
ordination have diminished the prospect of successful flight.258 
The FBI’s NCIC database facilitates rapid information 
sharing.259 For high-profile suspects, shows like America’s Most 
Wanted significantly increase the likelihood of apprehension.260 
For other defendants, internet mug shots make it difficult to 
hide.261 Professor Wiseman explains that “technological advances 
in tracking and monitoring defendants” have meant that “there 
is no longer as high a likelihood of avoiding conviction by escap-
 
 255 Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 894–95 (cited in note 16) (describing conditions of 
release that manage nonappearance risk). 
 256 Legislatures and courts have long recognized this connection; a defendant’s fi-
nancial resources are a listed federal statutory factor. 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A). See also 
notes 172–76 and accompanying text. See also Why It Matters (Uptrust), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9XY2-ZNUJ (“When poor people miss court, they do not flee.”). 
 257 There is at least one decades-old study that suggests that money bail deters 
flight for released defendants. See Samuel L. Myers Jr, The Economics of Bail Jumping, 
10 J Legal Stud 381, 395 (1981) (finding that setting higher bail discouraged flight 
among released defendants). 
 258 Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1352–53 (cited in note 29). See also Harmon, 115 Mich 
L Rev at 339–40 (cited in note 69) (explaining that technology makes it increasingly easy 
to locate a suspect if he fails to appear); id (describing the “extensive digital trail” creat-
ed by the use of “credit cards, bank cards, electronic benefits transfer (EBT) cards, 
monthly transit cards, electronic tolling devices (like FasTrak and EZPass), and many 
other location-based services and devices,” in addition to cell phones). 
 259 Unfortunately, use of the database is not universal. See Law Enforcement 
Information Sharing (Information Sharing Environment), archived at 
http://perma.cc/THB7-MVHN. 
 260 Miles, 48 J L & Econ at 281 (cited in note 80) (“[E]stimates show that broadcast-
ing a fugitive’s profile on America’s Most Wanted substantially raises the apprehension 
hazard by a factor of seven and shortens the expected fugitive spell by roughly a 
fourth.”). 
 261 Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1352–53 (cited in note 29). 
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ing across a state or county line, as the police will eventually de-
tect and track down the defendant.”262 
Unfortunately, although courts and commentators frequent-
ly describe nonappearance risk in terms of “flight,” the data 
rarely segregate flight from other FTAs. There are reports and 
studies that purport to isolate data about “fugitives” from other 
nonappearance data, but those reports and studies generally do 
not use the term “fugitives” to refer to fleeing defendants.263 
Some studies of flight behavior show how we can gather 
more data about defendants who flee the jurisdiction. Although 
limited, these studies offer preliminary insights into where flee-
ing defendants may be most likely to go and how they behave. 
For example, based on a recent study of alleged sex offenders 
who unlawfully crossed federal, state, or tribal lines, for exam-
ple, Professor Bierie and Paul Detar found that “fugitives who 
live alone choose familiar areas, and those who go to an unfamil-
iar location tend to reside with friends, partners, or family.”264 
Bierie and Detar concluded that “fugitives often need some con-
nection to the life they had prior to their warrant—few can truly 
disappear to seek a new life wholly unconnected with their prior 
one.”265 Bierie and Detar’s study is one of the few to study “flight 
behavior,” including “the distance offenders traveled, whether 
they lived alone or with others at capture, and whether they 
were arrested in a community they were familiar with (e.g., a 
city they had lived in before).”266 
 
 262 Id at 1362. 
 263 Cohen and Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts at *7 
(cited in note 45); Cohen Email (cited in note 47) (explaining that the term “fugitives” 
included defendants who “remained in the local jurisdiction”). See also Helland and 
Tabarrok, 47 J L & Econ at 109 (cited in note 57) (“Those [defendants] who remain at 
large more than 1 year are called fugitives.”). 
 264 Bierie and Detar, 62 Crime & Delinq at 996 (cited in note 249). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id at 983. Bierie and Detar found that 37 percent of the offenders in their study 
fled to a familiar area, 65% lived with friends or family at capture, and 50% 
traveled more than 370 miles (with 35% residing in an adjacent state to the 
last known address). Analyses also showed that these three outcomes varied as 
a function of offender demographics, geographic history, social networks, and 
criminal history. 
Id. 
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B. The Nuances of “Local” Nonappearance 
Even after isolating “local” nonappearances from flight, fur-
ther distinctions ought to be drawn between two types of local 
nonappearance: what this Article terms “low-cost 
nonappearance” and “local absconding.” The distinctions be-
tween these categories turn on the intent of defendants,267 the 
persistence or duration of their nonappearances, the prevent-
ability of their FTAs, and the costs imposed by their 
nonappearances—that is, the costs of returning these defend-
ants to court through rearrest or other means.268 
1. Low-cost nonappearance. 
The problem with an overly broad definition of 
nonappearance is that it lumps comparatively minor forms of 
nonappearance together with much more serious and costly 
nonappearance problems. This conflation raises the question: 
How do these purportedly minor nonappearances differ from 
what is termed “local absconding” below? The key differences, 
outlined here, turn on: (i) why defendants who fall into this cat-
egory fail to appear; (ii) what interventions might improve their 
appearance rates; and (iii) the cost of returning these defendants 
to court if they do fail to appear. All of these distinctions focus 
on the differences in the costs that these nonappearances impose 
on the system. 
a) Explanations/purpose.  These low-cost nonappearances 
include defendants who fail to appear for a range of different 
reasons, including: being unaware of or forgetting the date of the 
court appearance (which might reflect either ineffective notice 
by the court or poor calendar management by the defendant); 
illness or other unforeseen personal emergencies; external logis-
tical challenges including employment conflicts, childcare issues, 
or lack of transportation; confusion or ignorance about the pro-
cess or a general lack of capacity to navigate the process (this 
may reflect the complexity of the system and/or the defendant’s 
cognitive limitations); fear of punishment relating to the pend-
 
 267 The intent of a defendant is not being gauged as a measure of culpability. In-
stead, it functions as a sort of proxy for the likelihood of assuring future appearances 
and the costs of recovering or locating defendants who do not appear. 
 268 It is worth noting that the seriousness of the offense of arrest is discussed 
throughout this Part as it intersects with each of the proposed categories. It is not, how-
ever, used to define the categories. 
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ing charge; or lacking the funds to pay fines and fees that are 
owed at the courthouse.269 Judges have different means of ad-
dressing each of these underlying causes, and it is easy to antic-
ipate that a judge trying to manage this type of nonappearance 
risk might approach the endeavor with a checklist to determine 
what interventions to employ. 
Criminologists are increasingly drawing similar distinctions 
between who they describe as “active flaunters” and 
“inadvertent absconders.”270 As Professor John Goldkamp ex-
plains, defendants who fail to appear for court include the “ac-
tive flaunters as well as inadvertent absconders who did not 
miss their court requirements through intentional actions—
rather, they may have been confused or lost in the courts.”271 
Professors Daniel Flannery and Jeff Kretschmar elaborate 
on the same idea, explaining that at least some nonappearing 
defendants “may just not have the capacity or competence to 
show up at court hearings at the required place and time.”272 
When individuals who fail to appear inadvertently or for other 
nonwillful reasons are lumped in with other “fugitives” and 
“flight risks,” there is clear potential for mismanagement of the 
risks that are actually present. The risk-assessment tools de-
scribed above make that precise mistake. 
While the “inadvertent” nonappearances envisioned by 
Goldkamp are certainly part of the category proposed here, that 
label is too narrow. As the examples provided above make clear, 
some of the defendants who fall into the low-cost category pro-
posed here are deliberate (and not inadvertent) nonappearances. 
One might be tempted to label the entire category “excusa-
ble” nonappearances, but that term is problematic because it 
may not align with current court practices regarding excusing 
FTAs. As noted in Part IV.C below, however, adjusting current 
 
 269 See Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev at 338 (cited in note 69) (discussing the “familiar 
and manageable” reasons defendants might fail to appear). See also Why It Matters (cit-
ed in note 256) (contending that poor defendants who “miss court” do so “because they 
lack transportation, could not take time off work, had to care for their children, or simply 
don’t keep a good calendar”). 
 270 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 429–30 (cited in note 45) (asserting that 
these ideas are implied in Flannery and Kretschmar’s study of the Fugitive Safe 
Surrender program). See also Bierie, 79 Fed Probation at 27–28 (cited in note 48) (draw-
ing similar distinction between “unintentional” and “intentional” fugitives). 
 271 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 429 (cited in note 45). 
 272 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 451–52 (cited in note 54). 
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court practices is a key part of this Article’s proposed reform 
agenda. 
b) Preventability.  Appearance rates are distinctively 
“malleable” for defendants in this subcategory.273 For example, 
studies show that reminding defendants or their families of 
court dates can significantly reduce FTAs.274 In a 2011 study, re-
searchers reviewed studies that evaluated various court remind-
er systems for low-level defendants who received citations.275 
Another study found that, by providing reminders to those de-
fendants, the court system was able to reduce the FTA rate 
“from 25 percent in the control group to six percent in the re-
minder group when the caller spoke directly to the defendant, 15 
percent when a message was left with another person, and 21 
percent when a message was left on an answering service.”276 
Other studies have also reported “immediate and dramatic 
improvements” with implementing similar reminder and notifi-
cation procedures.277 Some jurisdictions also “take advantage of 
each and every contact with [released] defendants to remind 
them of their obligations,” by ensuring, for example, that staff at 
drug testing facilities also remind defendants when required 
court appearances are looming.278 Administrators of one notifica-
tion program in San Mateo, California, report that most FTAs 
are not willful and that logistical and practical issues underlie 
the majority of FTAs (for example, lost paperwork, lack of con-
tact information, and fear to ask questions, among others).279 
 
 273 Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev at 337–38 (cited in note 69) (describing the “malle-
ab[ility]” of appearance rates for defendants who are issued citations instead of being 
arrested). 
 274 Bornstein, et al, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 76 (cited in note 54) (discussing 
test results which “show[ed] that a reminder effectively reduces the FTA rate”). See also 
Marie VanNostrand, Kenneth J. Rose, and Kimberly Weibrecht, State of the Science of 
Pretrial Release Recommendations and Supervision *20 (Pretrial Justice Institute, June 
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/QFK5-8UGG (summarizing studies of notifications in 
different jurisdictions and noting that “[a]ll of the studies concluded that court date noti-
fications in some form are effective at reducing failures to appear in court”). 
 275 VanNostrand, Rose, and Weibrecht, State of the Science at *15–20 (cited in 
note 274). 
 276 Subramanian, et al, Incarceration’s Front Door, at *33–34 (cited in note 4) (de-
scribing data from Coconino County, Arizona). See also VanNostrand, Rose, and 
Weibrecht, State of the Science at *17–18 (cited in note 274). 
 277 Barry Mahoney, et al, Pretrial Services Programs: Responsibilities and Potential 
*39 (National Institute of Justice, Mar 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/7L3C-F5XM. 
 278 Id at *40 (describing a program in the District of Columbia). 
 279 Id at *39: 
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Jurisdictions also report improved appearance rates when 
community organizations and networks are engaged in creative 
and novel ways to help ensure that defendants are aware of ap-
pearance dates and able to appear when required.280 A startup 
company called Uptrust is currently marketing to county gov-
ernments a “behavioral science-driven SMS reminder service” 
that will increase court appearance rates and therefore lead 
to reductions in the use of pretrial detention to manage non-
appearance risk.281 
There are other tools that judges can use to discourage or 
prevent FTAs, including improving access to high-quality 
substance abuse treatment and improving pretrial services 
support. In Part IV.C, various systemic changes are proposed, 
all of which will improve appearance rates among this group 
of defendants. 
Pretrial detention and more aggressive forms of community 
supervision are unnecessary for defendants who could be 
nudged back to court on the appointed day with a simple and 
inexpensive reminder. 
c) Low costs.  Even if some of these nonappearances can-
not be prevented, they can be viewed as low-cost events for at 
least two reasons. First, the injury or harm that these individu-
als inflict on the system is less serious. While those who flee or 
abscond “harm the public by preventing the operation of its 
criminal justice system,” defendants who fall into the category of 
low-cost nonappearances impose shorter-term administrative 
burdens.282 Thinking in terms of the “justice costs” described 
above, these defendants, while clearly “annoying” contributors to 
an already inefficient system, are not likely to evade justice 
permanently.283 
 
[M]any failures to appear can be averted by reminding the defendants of their 
upcoming court appointments. . . . We have had a positive effect on both de-
fendants and the criminal justice system by explaining to these individuals 
how the system works, answering their questions, and explaining the im-
portance of coming to court. 
 280 See Simonson, 115 Mich L Rev at 634 (cited in note 203) (describing appearance 
rates of defendants whose release is funded by community bail funds). 
 281 Uptrust (AngelList), online at http://angel.co/uptrust (visited Nov 10, 2017) (Perma 
archive unavailable). See also What We Do (Uptrust), archived at http://perma.cc/726W 
-TNXB (“Through a mix of automation and on-demand human interaction we humanize 
the confusing criminal justice process for low-income defendants.”). 
 282 Russell M. Gold, Jail as Injunction *32–33 (unpublished manuscript, 2017) (on 
file with author). 
 283 Id. See also notes 79–87 and accompanying text. 
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In addition, returning a nonappearing defendant to court is 
likely to be a relatively low-cost proposition if that person is not 
actively and persistently avoiding the courthouse, like the true 
flight examples described above and the local absconders de-
scribed below. First, courts should attempt to resolve FTAs 
without penalties by simply advising the suspect of the missed 
court date and urging a prompt return to court.284 As noted 
above, some jurisdictions already take this approach by not for-
mally recording an FTA until steps have been taken to alert a 
defendant of the missed appearance and the no-cost opportunity 
to correct it.285 
Even if a phone call does not work, if a nonappearing de-
fendant can be readily located and approached, then pretrial de-
tention is an unnecessary, expensive, and oppressive way to 
prevent that type of nonappearance.286 Policymakers looking to 
reduce pretrial incarceration should weigh the costs and availa-
bility of other mechanisms for ensuring that these defendants 
return to court.287 
 
 284 Professor Rachel Harmon cites a study of defendants who failed to appear after 
being issued a citation that suggests that this would be a promising approach. Harmon, 
115 Mich L Rev at 338 (cited in note 69) (“In one study, over half of the failures to appear 
were solved by continuing the case for a week and informing the suspect of the new day, 
with no additional penalty for the initial failure to appear.”). See also Schnacke, 
Fundamentals of Bail at *104 (cited in note 100) (citing a different study that examined 
the same question). 
 285 Based on survey data collected from 112 of the 150 most populous counties in the 
United States, the Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) found that 69 percent of respondents 
“report that staff of a pre-trial services program or similar entity make an effort to con-
tact defendants and urge them to return to court voluntarily.” Survey of County Pretrial 
Release Policies at *10 (cited in note 50). Of those jurisdictions that attempt to contact 
defendants, 68 percent make telephone calls, 36 percent send letters, and 16 percent 
make home visits. Id. See also Mahoney, et al, Pretrial Services Programs: 
Responsibilities and Potential at *40 (cited in note 277) (“Pretrial services programs that 
have established specialized failure-to-appear units universally report that most way-
ward defendants are not ‘on the lam’ but, rather, can be quickly reached at home or 
work.”). 
 286 The average cost of detaining a defendant pretrial is approximately $19,253. 
VanNostrand and Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court at *36 (cited in 
note 208). In New York City, the daily cost of detaining a defendant pretrial is approxi-
mately $123 per day. See Cost of Pre-trial Detention in City Jails Takes Bite out of Big 
Apple’s Budget (NYC Independent Budget Office), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8DVX-VYY6. See also Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1372–74 (cited in 
note 29) (gathering daily cost statistics and comparing different types of supervision). In 
the federal prison system, the daily cost of pretrial detention is $73.03. Supervision Costs 
Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System (US Courts, July 18, 2013), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/WD45-B4M2. 
 287 See, for example, Vera Institute of Justice, Bail Bond Supervision in Three 
Counties: Report on Intensive Pretrial Supervision in Nassau, Bronx, and Essex Counties 
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Of course, even short-term nonappearances trigger nuisance 
costs. These include the administrative costs of rescheduling 
court dates and the wasted time of court personnel and attor-
neys when court dates are rescheduled.288 Once a defendant fails 
to appear, the government may also incur some expense locating 
and rearresting defendants.289 Time spent locating and 
rearresting defendants who fail to appear on their own volition 
imposes opportunity costs, as well. Those officers could be 
spending that time on other investigations and endeavors. 
Although jurisdictions with arrest warrant backlogs com-
plain of an inability to serve outstanding warrants due to a “lack 
of manpower,”290 that complaint seems flawed. It is likely that it 
is still more costly to detain defendants in this category than to 
locate them, so the manpower issue is one of resource allocation 
(and not truly a claim that the costs of rearrest are higher than 
the costs of detention). The resource allocation problem could re-
flect either red tape and bureaucracy problems or, perhaps more 
likely, the fact that many outstanding warrants are issued for 
offenses that are simply not a high enough priority to justify any 
additional resource expenditure. Professor Rachel Harmon 
asserts that “much of the time, no one bothers to hunt for sus-
pects who fail to appear, though that is often because they were 
not worth charging with a crime in the first place.”291 
These distinctions are useful as interventions are consid-
ered. As Goldkamp explains, the distinctions suggest that “sanc-
tioning and threat may not serve effectively as the all-purpose 
response relevant in all cases.”292 As Professor Tabarrok has ex-
plained, adopting a “behavioral perspective” would permit courts 
 
*15–16 (Aug 1995), archived at http://perma.cc/JJ7T-4ZJT. The Vera report cites a 1992 
study in which researchers found that, when under intensive supervision, defendants 
released pretrial had an FTA rate of 0.7 percent. Id at *16. In the same year, a similar 
study of defendants released from jail “with no consistent supervision pending the dispo-
sition of their cases” found that those defendants who were released unsupervised had 
an FTA rate of 42 percent. Id. 
 288 Helland and Tabarrok, 47 J L & Econ at 94 (cited in note 57) (“Defendants who 
fail to appear impose significant costs on others. Direct costs include the costs of rear-
ranging and rescheduling court dates, the wasted time of judges, lawyers, and other 
court personnel, and the costs necessary to find and apprehend or rearrest fugitives.”). 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id at 98. 
 291 Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev at 340 (cited in note 69). See also notes 67–71 and ac-
companying text. 
 292 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 431 (cited in note 45) (asserting that these ide-
as are implied in Flannery and Kretschmar’s study of the Fugitive Safe Surrender pro-
gram), citing Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 456 (cited in note 54). 
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to view “crime control as less about punishing rational actors 
and more about helping criminogenic people to overcome their 
behavioral biases, thereby avoiding crime and the sequence of 
choices and events that inexorably leads to imprisonment and 
downfall.”293 
2. Local absconding. 
Of course, not all local FTAs are cheaply or easily prevented 
or remedied. Although imperfect, the lines between the low-cost 
nonappearances described above and the “local absconders” cat-
egory described below reflect a combination of the willfulness, 
persistence, and higher costs associated with preventing and 
managing these nonappearances. 
a) Willfulness.  Some nonappearing defendants actively 
and willfully avoid court and hide from law enforcement. Simple 
reminders are unlikely to bring them back to court. Even if they 
lack the resources to leave the jurisdiction, some defendants will 
actively work to “evade capture,” making “specific and strategic” 
choices to avoid detection, including, for example, “avoiding 
some forms of employment, choosing not to apply for public ben-
efits, or otherwise limiting their interaction with formal institu-
tions that could signal their location to authorities.”294 As this 
description immediately makes clear, the conduct of these local 
absconders creates a host of cascading problems for them and for 
their communities.295 
The true flight risks described above are similarly willful—
they act intentionally and with a purpose to thwart the judicial 
process to avoid prosecution and punishment. The key distinc-
tion between these two groups is geographic. As noted above, 
fleeing the jurisdiction imposes costs and problems that distin-
guish it from local absconding. Members of the latter group are 
 
 293 Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 466–67 (cited in note 91). 
 294 Bierie and Detar, 62 Crime & Delinq at 985 (cited in note 249). See also Flannery 
and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 439 (cited in note 54). 
 295 Bierie and Detar have explained that defendants who are actively hiding from 
law enforcement to “avoid capture” struggle to meet other “core needs,” including “access 
to shelter, income, safety, and social or emotional support.” Bierie and Detar, 62 Crime 
& Delinq at 986 (cited in note 249). Because “traditional avenues to meeting these needs 
are often inhibited or blocked,” these defendants are forced to seek out alternative, often 
criminal arrangements, and they “experience increased risk of physical danger and risk 
of exploitation because . . . [of their] inability to seek protection from police or courts.” Id. 
See also notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
736 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:677 
 
easier and less expensive to find than defendants who have fled 
the jurisdiction. 
Relying on willfulness is not a new premise. Some jurisdic-
tions use willfulness to determine whether an FTA will be ex-
cused and whether a defendant who fails to appear forfeits his 
bail.296 For these reasons, there is a temptation to call this cate-
gory “willful nonappearances.” But willfulness of an initial non-
appearance is sometimes defined broadly by courts (and might 
capture some of the low-cost nonappearances described above). 
And deliberately missing a court date does not quite capture the 
problems presented by this category. For example, a defendant 
who deliberately misses court in order to keep his job belongs in 
the low-cost nonappearance bucket. A defendant who deliberate-
ly misses court to evade justice is properly categorized as a local 
absconder. Considering persistence and cost in combination with 
willfulness helps to narrow this category appropriately. 
b) Persistence.  Nonappearances with a longer duration 
(that is, more persistent nonappearances) impose greater 
costs on the community than short-term nonappearances. 
Why does persistence matter? Certainly, as time passes, the 
more intangible costs of failing to secure justice for the under-
lying offense might be viewed as increasing.297 The direct costs 
of a nonappearing defendant increase over time, as well.298 
We have not adequately invested in identifying the de-
fendants who frequently become persistent nonappearances, 
but the data regarding persistence are available, so this work 
could be done with some ease. For example, in their analysis of 
data about pretrial release of state felony defendants, Thomas 
Cohen and Brian Reaves used the term “fugitive” to refer to 
“anyone who missed a court appearance but could not be found 
(e.g., brought back to court) within the one year study coverage 
period.”299 
 
 296 See, for example, Ark Code Ann § 16-84-203(a) (excusing defendants for failing to 
appear when prevented by illness or by detention in a jail or correctional facility). 
 297 This assumes that justice delayed for a long time imposes greater costs on the 
community than swift or merely briefly delayed justice. The assumption does not seem 
particularly controversial because the swiftness of punishment is relevant to both the 
retributive and the utilitarian goals of punishment. 
 298 See Part I.C. 
 299 Cohen Email (cited in note 47). See also Cohen and Reaves, Pretrial Release of 
Felony Defendants in State Courts at *8–10 (cited in note 45) (discussing the “fugitive 
rate” during their one-year study). 
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Although persistence is relevant and seems easy to track, it 
poses some problems and, like willfulness, should not be the sole 
criterion for prioritizing risks among local nonappearances. 
Principally, there is nothing in Cohen and Reaves’ data that in-
dicates the efforts made to notify, locate, and bring back to court 
the particular defendants.300 The passage of time may be some 
indication of the evasiveness of a defendant, which would be 
helpful for a risk manager to know. But it may also reflect the 
disinterest of the jurisdiction. That, in turn, may be a function of 
several issues: (i) how difficult it is (or would be) to find the de-
fendant; (ii) that the charged offense is not serious enough to 
justify the expenditure of effort to recover the defendant; or 
(iii) the weakness of the state’s case (even for more serious 
charges). Here again, these different explanations for the persis-
tence of the nonappearance would suggest different interven-
tions (or perhaps no intervention at all). Time, while relevant, 
cannot be the only categorical determinant. Combined with will-
fulness (described above) and higher costs (described next), it 
narrows our category of local absconders. 
c) Higher costs.  Defendants who willfully fail to appear 
and who do so for extended periods of time (or indefinitely) have 
been described as the “Achilles heel” of law enforcement.301 Par-
ticularly when “local absconders” have been charged with more 
serious crimes, their nonappearances impose greater justice 
costs. The costs of locating defendants who are actively hiding is 
higher. Locating these defendants is possible but likely more 
“resource intensive” than locating defendants in the low-cost 
category.302 For this group, then, more aggressive conditions of 
release might be warranted. 
C. A Research and Reform Agenda 
This Article’s new taxonomy is a preliminary step. Because 
this taxonomy has not been formally recognized, gathering data 
about these new categories is an immediate priority. In addition, 
the definition of categories highlights systemic reforms that will 
 
 300 See generally Cohen and Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State 
Courts (cited in note 45). 
 301 Senate Hearings on Fugitives, 106th Cong, 2d Sess at 1 (cited in note 74). In a 
2000 hearing, Senator Strom Thurmond of the Senate Committee on Criminal Justice 
Oversight explained that “[f]ugitives represent not only an outrage to the rule of law, 
they are also a serious threat to public safety.” Id. 
 302 Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev at 340–41 (cited in note 69). 
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immediately reduce nonappearance rates. The final Section of 
this Article briefly sketches a research and reform agenda. 
Reformers must gather and analyze data about the number 
of defendants who might fall into each category and the inter-
ventions that best manage these distinct risks.303 This task will 
include: (i) collecting more data about true flight and local ab-
sconding to develop risk predictions for these more serious cate-
gories of nonappearances; (ii) collecting more data about which 
risk-management tools most effectively—and least intrusively—
manage and prevent all forms of nonappearance; and (iii) better 
managing the creation of FTA data at the front end of the pro-
cess, including, for example, suggesting best practices across ju-
risdictions about when FTAs are logged. Prior studies drawing 
some of the distinctions proposed here demonstrate that this re-
search and analysis is feasible.304 This Article illustrates that the 
work is also required by federal and state constitutions, stat-
utes, and as a matter of effective policymaking. 
A shift to risk management (and beyond risk measurement) 
also highlights the need to change aspects of the system to re-
duce nonappearances. Differentiating between risks will force 
self-reflection for a criminal justice system that is complicit in 
the nonappearance problem. While it is certainly appropriate to 
focus principally on alleged offenders in developing a new non-
appearance risk taxonomy (as the previous parts have done), 
there are also opportunities to reduce rates of nonappearance—
principally among the broadest category of low-cost 
nonappearances—by pursuing systemic changes. Those changes 
should occur along at least five fronts. 
First, the system’s complexity makes it difficult to navigate, 
particularly for defendants who may have “lower levels of educa-
tion and IQ than the general population.”305 Judges within the 
system can work to simplify the process for the defendants who 
 
 303 See Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 431 (cited in note 45) (calling for “better 
descriptive data” about fugitives and observing that “[t]ypes of fugitives can be identified 
that call possibly for a range of different responses, both preventive and reactive, that 
target specifically the different problems associated with each type”). 
 304 See notes 55, 56, 287 and accompanying text. 
 305 Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 468 (cited in note 91): 
Despite the difficulty of navigation, the criminal justice system can be unfor-
giving to those who fail to meet its dictates. Simplifying the process and offer-
ing one-stop shopping is not only more just, but it also means that punishment 
is more swift and certain, a benefit both for the defendants and for society. 
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appear before them,306 or they can adjust their expectations and 
make appropriate accommodations. 
Second, studies suggest that nonappearance rates increase 
as court delays increase.307 Reducing unnecessary delays must 
be a priority. In jurisdictions with bloated criminal court dockets 
and lengthy backlogs,308 high rates of nonappearance may not be 
surprising. Defendants may be expected to return to court fre-
quently, “spend[ing] all day waiting for their cases to be called, 
only to be told that the proceedings are being put off for another 
month.”309 Addressing these dysfunctional court backlogs and 
reducing the time between an arrest and the resolution of a 
criminal case may help reduce rates of nonappearance.310 
The third proposed system intervention allows for increased 
flexibility in scheduling court appearances. In prior studies, 
courts that permit appearances on weekends and evenings have 
seen increases in appearance rates.311 Even without opening the 
 
 306 Id at 469. See also notes 311–12 and accompanying text. 
 307 See Mary T. Phillips, The Past, Present, and Possible Future of Desk Appearance 
Tickets in New York City *42, 72 (NYC Criminal Justice Agency, Mar 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M88D-MW5B (describing results from a study of appearance rates for 
desk appearance tickets issued in New York City, finding a “strong association between 
FTA and arrest-to-arraignment time,” and concluding that “FTA rates, although already 
far lower than in previous decades, could be reduced further by scheduling arraignments 
more quickly following the arrest”). 
 308 For example, a 2016 federal class-action lawsuit filed by the Bronx Defenders 
indicated that the average pending age of misdemeanor cases at the end of 2015 was 827 
days. Amended Complaint, Trowbridge v DiFiore, Civil Action No 16-3455, *24 (SDNY 
filed Jan 23, 2017). This litigation is currently stayed pending settlement negotiations. 
Trowbridge v. Cuomo (Bronx Defenders, June 27, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ML9J-H4AH. 
 309 A Nightmare Worthy of Dickens (NY Times, May 12, 2016), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/opinion/a-nightmare-court-worthy-of-dickens.html 
(visited Nov 11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (characterizing the Bronx criminal 
courts as a “horribly managed court system that has neither the resources nor the incen-
tive to move any faster”). 
 310 Although concern about court backlogs and delays has prompted some speedy-
trial reforms, it is not clear how effective these reforms will be. The bail reforms that 
took effect in New Jersey at the beginning of 2017, for example, included New Jersey’s 
first speedy-trial rule. In New York, Kalief’s Law, legislation proposed to amend New 
York’s speedy-trial rules, is currently pending in the state senate. Squadron Passes 1st 
Step in Speedy Trial Reform through Codes Committee (NY State Senate, June 6, 2017), 
archived at http://perma.cc/5MPL-S4Q4. 
 311 See Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 469 (cited in note 91) (concluding that the 
“popularity” of the Saturday surrender option in the Fugitive Safe Surrender program 
“indicates that many fugitives have jobs that they do not want to lose” and demonstrates 
that “a more flexible criminal justice system could better help individuals to reintegrate 
with civil society”). See also id (describing a 1990s night-court “experiment” in Cook 
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court at those times, courts might adopt more accommodating 
approaches to scheduling and rescheduling future appearances 
if necessary.312 Criminal courts might also consider permitting 
defendants to appear remotely.313 
Courts must also adjust their responses to nonappearance. 
For the reasons outlined above, immediately logging an FTA 
and issuing a bench warrant is not an effective strategy for ad-
dressing nonappearance, particularly for low-level offenders.314 
In addition, courts must eliminate the imposition of fines 
and fees on those who cannot afford to pay them, and should 
consider taking these steps as part of broader amnesty efforts 
for defendants who fail to appear.315 Too many defendants indi-
cate that they cannot afford to return to court due to steep court 
fees and fines to clear warrants.316 The Department of Justice’s 
2015 report on Ferguson described the Ferguson municipal 
court’s “focus on revenue generation” as leading to “court prac-
tices that violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and 
equal protection requirements.”317 In particular, the report 
singled out the issuing of municipal arrest warrants “as a rou-
tine response to missed court appearances” intended to generate 
financial benefits for the court, in part because each additional 
missed appearance triggered more fines and fees.318 Former 
 
County, Illinois, in which “disposition time fell from 245 days to 86 days, and the number 
of court dates per case fell from 11 to just over 6”). 
 312 See id (“Whether through night courts, weekend courts, or otherwise, simplifying 
and speeding up the criminal justice system could improve both justice and efficiency.”). 
See also Summons Reform (cited in note 73) (describing summons reform efforts in New 
York City, including both greater clarity about how and when to respond to a summons 
and broadening the “window within which to satisfy the summons”). 
 313 CourtCall, a vendor that provides remote-access services for courthouses, ex-
plains that its “remote video technology provides motorists the opportunity to save time 
and costs by being heard remotely and creates greater efficiencies for the courts and law 
enforcement. More importantly, those contesting traffic citations need not be required to 
miss work, school or family obligations.” What Is CourtCall (CourtCall), archived at 
http://perma.cc/H7AL-PPAD (emphasis omitted). 
 314 This summer, the New York City Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice announced a 
“warrants campaign” to research and implement “the best way to encourage individuals 
to come to court and clear their warrants.” Warrants Campaign (City Record Online, 
June 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/C5HK-BTPV. 
 315 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 439 (cited in note 54) (describ-
ing the role of broad amnesty efforts in clearing backlogs and returning some defendants 
to the process). 
 316 Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 476 (cited in note 58) (“Court fees and other fines 
required to clear a warrant can also represent a financial hardship on some individuals 
and families, and it could be the root cause of leaving a warrant outstanding.”). 
 317 Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department at *3 (cited in note 71). 
 318 Id. 
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President Barack Obama described the role that these sorts of 
“user fees” play in “consigning those who cannot afford to pay to 
a cycle of debt, incarceration, and prolonged poverty.”319 
The final system-focused intervention is less an independent 
proposal and more a byproduct of using the taxonomy and im-
plementing the other interventions proposed here. The proposed 
taxonomy requires considering the different circumstances that 
lead to nonappearance. That inquiry may foster greater judicial 
and system-wide awareness of the competency, capacity, and re-
source limitations that inhibit compliance with court orders. 
Ideally, greater awareness will increase investment in flexible 
schedules or transportation and childcare accommodations that 
might increase appearance rates. In this way, requiring judges 
to inquire about—and strategize to address—the reasons for 
nonappearance could humanize the process and improve system 
outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
This country’s uniquely swollen jail population and new 
economic reality have created a fiscal appetite for reform that is 
almost as great as the country’s moral obligation to reassess its 
pretrial detention practices. We have a system in which deten-
tion is the default choice. Overestimating pretrial risks has 
driven the jail population’s growth. 
Judges imposing conditions of release or ordering pretrial 
detention must be clear-eyed about the precise risks they are 
trying to avoid or mitigate. The existing ambiguity is 
symptomatic of broader pretrial risk-measurement and risk-
management problems. These persistent problems threaten new 
bail reform efforts. Greater precision is needed in the statutes, 
in the research being done to study these problems, in the judg-
es’ attempts to manage these risks, and in the risk-assessment 
tools being developed to aid that endeavor. 
While new risk-assessment tools promise improvements for 
pretrial decisionmaking, they also pose special risks. The tools 
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lay bare obligations to address fundamental flaws in the existing 
doctrine, and, indeed, they make those obligations more urgent. 
If new risk-assessment tools map onto overbroad definitions of 
risk, it is likely that detention rates will not decrease signifi-
cantly. Worse yet, weak definitions of the risks being addressed 
during the pretrial phase may gain legitimacy if supported by 
“scientific” estimates. 
If risk-assessment tools are to fulfill the promise of reducing 
detention rates, they must identify and isolate those defendants 
who pose the most serious and costly pretrial risks. We have 
constitutional and statutory obligations to be clear about the 
outcomes we are trying to prevent and to be sparing in our use 
of liberty-restricting tools to avoid and manage those pretrial 
risks. 
